IDS mailing list archives
RE: IDS is dead, etc
From: "Bob Buel" <bob () buel org>
Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2003 11:34:46 -0500
Gentlemen: Being a spectator to this discussion, I have to comment the obvious, that in security, there can be no "perfectly implemented" anything. As long as there is access to a system, there can be an attack. Your firewall could be hacked. You can't say that there's not some vulnerability that will be in tomorrow's news. You can't even say that you won't have a hormonal inbalance on Monday morning, and alter that "perfect implementation". How can you make your systems safe? Go to your switch now and unplug all servers from their jacks. Are they safe now? No, of course not, since they can still be accessed via console. Ok, turn off the server, and put it in a vault behind a 7 foot concrete bunker. Is it safe? Nope. Still can't say that. (Verisign unplugs their root server, use a bunker, alarms, armed guards, and still won't ever say it's safe!) Sure, the odds are better, but whether or not your system will actually be attacked is an equation byproduct of the attacker's motivation and your safeguards. Now, if you will excuse the dialectical silliness of this rant, the purpose of an NIDS is now clear--it is a reporting tool of what actually did or try to happen on that network. Much as I appreciate the practicality of what you are saying, and agree totally with it in an ideal sort of way, I can never say those thoughts out loud where someone might hear it, because it is not a perfect world, never will be, and I can't afford not to keep a watchful eye for someone, sufficiently motivated, who will do the impossible! Good day, gentlemen one and all, and I have thoroughly enjoyed your discussion! Bob Subject: Re: IDS is dead, etc 2003-08-07T16:49:10 Barry Fitzgerald:
Oh yes, and someone (perhaps tongue-in-cheek) mentioned that a properly configured firewall removes the need for an NIDS.
Perhaps you're referring to my comment: 2003-08-06T14:57:53 Bennett Todd: > 2003-08-06T07:39:28 Paul Schmehl: > > Why would you want to know about Nimda attacks > > against your servers? > > (or more generally, attacks that won't succeed) > > Some people _don't_ care. They need to disable the > sigs they don't care about, or configure their IDS > to only match those sigs against servers for which > they're relevent. > > The limiting case of this argument says that given > a really perfectly implemented firewall, you don't > need an IDS at all. Some folks don't.
I have to chime in and say that I couldn't possibly disagree more.
Understandable. I really shouldn't have included that remark; or else I should have expanded on it. I didn't say "properly configured firewall", I said "really perfectly implemented firewall", and I meant something different by that, although I neglected to explain. A perfectly implemented firewall allows no protocols through for which there are vulnerable implementations inside. That means it's impossible to implement a perfect firewall if you're going to allow Windows users to have internet access. You can come moderately close, with a hideous amount of work, but you'll still be very exposed, and an IDS will be critical reinforcement of your flawed security. But given suitable systems configuration, it is possbile to have a perfect firewall, and if you do then an IDS is just an educational tool, and would probably be most useful in concert with a honeypot. -Bennett --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Captus Networks - Integrated Intrusion Prevention and Traffic Shaping - Instantly Stop DoS/DDoS Attacks, Worms & Port Scans - Automatically Control P2P, IM and Spam Traffic - Ensure Reliable Performance of Mission Critical Applications Precisely Define and Implement Network Security and Performance Policies **FREE Vulnerability Assessment Toolkit - WhitePapers - Live Demo Visit us at: http://www.captusnetworks.com/ads/31.htm ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- Re: IDS is dead, etc, (continued)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Sam f. Stover (Aug 11)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Scott Wimer (Aug 11)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Bennett Todd (Aug 11)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Scott Wimer (Aug 11)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Bennett Todd (Aug 11)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Scott Wimer (Aug 11)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Bennett Todd (Aug 11)
- RE: IDS is dead, etc Security Conscious (Aug 11)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Jason Haar (Aug 11)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Frank Knobbe (Aug 11)
- RE: IDS is dead, etc Bob Buel (Aug 11)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Barry Fitzgerald (Aug 11)
- Belaboring the point of FPs Paul Schmehl (Aug 12)
- Re: Belaboring the point of FPs Martin Roesch (Aug 13)
- Message not available
- Off-Topic: perfect firewall (was Re: IDS is dead, etc) Bennett Todd (Aug 11)
- RE: IDS is dead, etc Omar Herrera (Aug 13)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Jonathan Rickman (Aug 15)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Paul Schmehl (Aug 19)
- Re: IDS is dead, etc Jonathan Rickman (Aug 21)