Snort mailing list archives

Re: More sid 1841


From: Michael Boman <michael.boman () securecirt com>
Date: Sat, 22 Feb 2003 22:59:20 +0800

On Fri, Feb 21, 2003 at 03:27:10PM -0500, Matt Kettler wrote:
Yes, you are correct, the \n needs to be part of the exploit, however the 
size of {url-here} is arbitrary. Snort is a simple pattern matcher, so it 
has no way of stating "look for "javascript://" followed by a "\n" 
somewhere before a quote character". Which is the only way of doing it 
that's not subject to false positives.

I suppose the code could make some bad assumptions and assume a domain is 
no longer than 100 bytes, and look for a \n within 100 bytes of 
javascript://. That's an improvement to the rule, but not a flawless fix, 
as now an attacker can just insert padding to get around setting off the alert.

According to RFC 1034 and 1035 the hostname can be a maximum of 255
bytes, so just make sure the '\n' are within 255 bytes from the end of
'javascript://'.

Best regards
 Michael Boman

-- 
Michael Boman
Security Architect, SecureCiRT Pte Ltd
http://www.securecirt.com

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