RE: ISPs as content-police or method-police

[Jason Slagle <raistlin () tacorp net>]

You basically have 3 choices here.

1) Filter known trojan ports to your customers (Which argueably may or may
not include port 139)

2) Routinely scan your customer blocks and inform them of trojans they
could be infected with, and any open shares.

3) Do nothing and deal with the possible fallout which may include turning
down the customers port, if they get compromised.

Which do YOU view as the lesser of the evils here.

Your arguing 1 isn't doable.  2 is possibly a no go, depending on the
contract and customer also, and 3 isn't very good either.

Jason

---
Jason Slagle - CCNA - CCDA
Network Administrator - Toledo Internet Access - Toledo Ohio
- raistlin () tacorp net - jslagle () toledolink com - WHOIS JS10172
/"\ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
\ /   ASCII Ribbon Campaign  . If dreams are like movies then memories
 X  - NO HTML/RTF in e-mail  .   are films about ghosts..
/ \ - NO Word docs in e-mail .     - Adam Duritz - Counting Crows


On Mon, 20 Nov 2000, Roeland Meyer wrote:

> Please reference any suit regarding breach of contract. Examples abound.
> Port filtering may be construed as a material breach when the expectation
> is, that there is to be no port filtering. Access is access, even when the
> customer doesn't know that they are being restricted in their access. That
> just assures you that they will go ballistic when they find out.
>
> Face it guys, you KNOW that this is basically dishonest. As such, it is
> indefensible. I would almost bet <amount> that none of the transit providers
> mentions restrictions, on access, in their contracts. I would almost bet
> <1/2 amount> that NONE of the access providers mention same in THEIR
> contracts. The general expectation is for clear and open pipes. Put such
> restiction into your contracts and you will lose customers. Don't put them
> in and start filtering anyway and you will lose court cases...big ones.