BSIMM update (informIT)

[gem at cigital.com (Gary McGraw)]

Hi again Mike,

Yadda yadda, delay, and so on...

On 2/2/10 9:30 PM, "Mike Boberski" <mike.boberski at gmail.com> wrote:
<somebody eslse said> But the vast majority of clients I work with don't have the time or need or ability to >take 
advantage of BSIMM

> > Mike's Top 5 Web Application Security Countermeasures:
> > 1. Add a security guy or gal who has a software development background to your application's software >>development 
> > team.

Dang, this would have saved Microsoft lots of money.  With 30,000 developers that security gal would have been pretty 
busy though.

> > 3. Build an Enterprise Security API (a.k.a. an ESAPI, e.g. OWASP's several different ESAPI toolkits) that is 
> > > > specific to your solution stack and minimally provides input validation controls that use whitelists, output 
> > > > encoding/escaping controls (optionally use parameterized interfaces for SQL), and authentication controls. >>Build 
> > your ESAPI to target a specific level of overall security when all of your security controls are viewed as >>a whole 
> > (e.g. an OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) level).

Why do you believe that an ESAPI (which is a good idea) is the best place to start?  Why not training?  Why not pen 
testing by Mike?  Etc.  This was not "job 1" in any firm I have been involved with.

> > 4. Write a programming manual (i.e. a secure coding standard that is specific to your solution stack that is 
> > > > organized by vulnerability type or security requirement with before and after code snippets, e.g. a >>cookbook that 
> > provides before and after code snippets and links to API documentation) that contains step->>by-step instructions for 
> > using your ESAPI to both proactively guard against vulnerabilities, and to act as a >>quick reference when the time 
> > comes to make fixes.

Again.  How does this fit into a bigger picture?  The notion of code guidelines is a good one.  See [CR2.1] in the 
BSIMM which 11 of 30 companies we observed carry out.  This was not "job 2" in any case I am aware of.  How about tying 
such guidance to code review technology.  We've helped multiple clients do that.

How many customers have followed Mike's Way?  What are their results?  How do the Mike's Way customers score with the 
BSIMM?

gem

company www.cigital.com
podcast www.cigital.com/silverbullet
blog www.cigital.com/justiceleague
book www.swsec.com


On Tue, Feb 2, 2010 at 7:23 PM, Steven M. Christey <coley at linus.mitre.org> wrote:

On Tue, 2 Feb 2010, Arian J. Evans wrote:

BSIMM is probably useful for government agencies, or some large
organizations. But the vast majority of clients I work with don't have
the time or need or ability to take advantage of BSIMM. Nor should
they. They don't need a software security group.

I'm looking forward to what BSIMM Basic discovers when talking to small and mid-size developers.  Many of the questions 
in the survey PDF assume that the respondent has at least thought of addressing software security, but not all 
questions assume the presence of an SSG, and there are even questions about the use of general top-n lists vs. 
customized top-n lists that may be informative.

- Steve

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