nanog mailing list archives

Re: BGP Experiment


From: Randy via NANOG <nanog () nanog org>
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 23:14:39 +0000 (UTC)

OP is yet to clarify how a single /24 advertisement caused a "massive-prefix spike/flap"; in OP's words.

The Experiment should continue.
-Randy


On Friday, January 25, 2019, 2:32:47 PM PST, Tom Beecher <beecher () beecher cc> wrote: 

If I understand this thread correctly, the test cause no actual change in the routing table size or route announcement. 
That was all a result of the incorrect behavior of the software. 

Instead of throwing rocks, how about some data instead. We can collaborate and better understand the whole thing so 
make it better and move on to the next thing. Yelling about "North America" when 4 of the 7 listed researchers on the 
test are NOT IN NORTH AMERICA doesn't really help anything. 





On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 10:25 AM Ben Cooper <ben () packet gg> wrote:
Can you stop this?

You caused again a massive prefix spike/flap, and as the internet is not centered around NA (shock horror!) a number 
of operators in Asia and Australia go effected by your “expirment” and had no idea what was happening or why.

Get a sandbox like every other researcher, as of now we have black holed and filtered your whole ASN, and have 
reccomended others do the same. 

On Wed, 23 Jan 2019 at 1:19 am, Italo Cunha <cunha () dcc ufmg br> wrote:
NANOG,

This is a reminder that this experiment will resume tomorrow
(Wednesday, Jan. 23rd). We will announce 184.164.224.0/24 carrying a
BGP attribute of type 0xff (reserved for development) between 14:00
and 14:15 GMT.

On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:05 AM Italo Cunha <cunha () dcc ufmg br> wrote:

NANOG,

We would like to inform you of an experiment to evaluate alternatives
for speeding up adoption of BGP route origin validation (research
paper with details [A]).

Our plan is to announce prefix 184.164.224.0/24 with a valid
standards-compliant unassigned BGP attribute from routers operated by
the PEERING testbed [B, C]. The attribute will have flags 0xe0
(optional transitive [rfc4271, S4.3]), type 0xff (reserved for
development), and size 0x20 (256bits).

Our collaborators recently ran an equivalent experiment with no
complaints or known issues [A], and so we do not anticipate any
arising. Back in 2010, an experiment using unassigned attributes by
RIPE and Duke University caused disruption in Internet routing due to
a bug in Cisco routers [D, CVE-2010-3035]. Since then, this and other
similar bugs have been patched [e.g., CVE-2013-6051], and new BGP
attributes have been assigned (BGPsec-path) and adopted (large
communities). We have successfully tested propagation of the
announcements on Cisco IOS-based routers running versions 12.2(33)SRA
and 15.3(1)S, Quagga 0.99.23.1 and 1.1.1, as well as BIRD 1.4.5 and
1.6.3.

We plan to announce 184.164.224.0/24 from 8 PEERING locations for a
predefined period of 15 minutes starting 14:30 GMT, from Monday to
Thursday, between the 7th and 22nd of January, 2019 (full schedule and
locations [E]). We will stop the experiment immediately in case any
issues arise.

Although we do not expect the experiment to cause disruption, we
welcome feedback on its safety and especially on how to make it safer.
We can be reached at disco-experiment () googlegroups com.

Amir Herzberg, University of Connecticut
Ethan Katz-Bassett, Columbia University
Haya Shulman, Fraunhofer SIT
Ítalo Cunha, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
Michael Schapira, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Tomas Hlavacek, Fraunhofer SIT
Yossi Gilad, MIT

[A] https://conferences.sigcomm.org/hotnets/2018/program.html
[B] http://peering.usc.edu
[C] https://goo.gl/AFR1Cn
[D] https://labs.ripe.net/Members/erik/ripe-ncc-and-duke-university-bgp-experiment
[E] https://goo.gl/nJhmx1

-- 
Ben Cooper
Chief Executive Officer
PacketGG - Multicast
M(Telstra): 0410 411 301
M(Optus):  0434 336 743
E: ben () packet gg & ben () multicast net au
W: https://packet.gg
W: https://multicast.net.au





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