Re: BGP Experiment

[Mike Hale <eyeronic.design () gmail com>]

Or you could simply fix your gear rather than leaving a big hole in your
infrastructure.

*shrug*

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019, 7:25 AM Ben Cooper <ben () packet gg wrote:

> Can you stop this?
>
> You caused again a massive prefix spike/flap, and as the internet is not
> centered around NA (shock horror!) a number of operators in Asia and
> Australia go effected by your “expirment” and had no idea what was
> happening or why.
>
> Get a sandbox like every other researcher, as of now we have black holed
> and filtered your whole ASN, and have reccomended others do the same.
>
> On Wed, 23 Jan 2019 at 1:19 am, Italo Cunha <cunha () dcc ufmg br> wrote:
>
> > NANOG,
> >
> > This is a reminder that this experiment will resume tomorrow
> > (Wednesday, Jan. 23rd). We will announce 184.164.224.0/24 carrying a
> > BGP attribute of type 0xff (reserved for development) between 14:00
> > and 14:15 GMT.
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:05 AM Italo Cunha <cunha () dcc ufmg br> wrote:
> > > NANOG,
> > >
> > > We would like to inform you of an experiment to evaluate alternatives
> > > for speeding up adoption of BGP route origin validation (research
> > > paper with details [A]).
> > >
> > > Our plan is to announce prefix 184.164.224.0/24 with a valid
> > > standards-compliant unassigned BGP attribute from routers operated by
> > > the PEERING testbed [B, C]. The attribute will have flags 0xe0
> > > (optional transitive [rfc4271, S4.3]), type 0xff (reserved for
> > > development), and size 0x20 (256bits).
> > >
> > > Our collaborators recently ran an equivalent experiment with no
> > > complaints or known issues [A], and so we do not anticipate any
> > > arising. Back in 2010, an experiment using unassigned attributes by
> > > RIPE and Duke University caused disruption in Internet routing due to
> > > a bug in Cisco routers [D, CVE-2010-3035]. Since then, this and other
> > > similar bugs have been patched [e.g., CVE-2013-6051], and new BGP
> > > attributes have been assigned (BGPsec-path) and adopted (large
> > > communities). We have successfully tested propagation of the
> > > announcements on Cisco IOS-based routers running versions 12.2(33)SRA
> > > and 15.3(1)S, Quagga 0.99.23.1 and 1.1.1, as well as BIRD 1.4.5 and
> > > 1.6.3.
> > >
> > > We plan to announce 184.164.224.0/24 from 8 PEERING locations for a
> > > predefined period of 15 minutes starting 14:30 GMT, from Monday to
> > > Thursday, between the 7th and 22nd of January, 2019 (full schedule and
> > > locations [E]). We will stop the experiment immediately in case any
> > > issues arise.
> > >
> > > Although we do not expect the experiment to cause disruption, we
> > > welcome feedback on its safety and especially on how to make it safer.
> > > We can be reached at disco-experiment () googlegroups com.
> > >
> > > Amir Herzberg, University of Connecticut
> > > Ethan Katz-Bassett, Columbia University
> > > Haya Shulman, Fraunhofer SIT
> > > Ítalo Cunha, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
> > > Michael Schapira, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
> > > Tomas Hlavacek, Fraunhofer SIT
> > > Yossi Gilad, MIT
> > >
> > > [A] https://conferences.sigcomm.org/hotnets/2018/program.html
> > > [B] http://peering.usc.edu
> > > [C] https://goo.gl/AFR1Cn
> > > [D]
> > https://labs.ripe.net/Members/erik/ripe-ncc-and-duke-university-bgp-experiment
> > > [E] https://goo.gl/nJhmx1
> --
> Ben Cooper
> Chief Executive Officer
> PacketGG - Multicast
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