Re: Firewall best practices

[Mathew Want <imortl1 () gmail com>]

Cian,

I agree that it would generate a warning but the issue you then have
is users go "Huh?, what?" and click on allow anyway.

To quote a presenter at a security course I attended "If the user is
given the choice between security and seeing a dancing snowman, the
snowman wins every time!".

The "advantage" that SSL had for the general populous for nonEvil(tm)
purposes was that we could say that if the little padlock was there
when they went to their internet banking site that their data was
safe*. These new technologies, although neccessary for a host of other
reasons such ad data leakage, covert communications etc etc etc
unfortunately push the responsibility for the security of personal
data closer to the people that it important to. Unfortunately they are
the least able to deal with it in general and as much as we TRY to
teach them ( and I do really try). We do try to protect users from
themselves, but there is only so much we can do.

I am not saying that the MITM function is not without its merrit (in
whatever form you see as the best for security) but it does then pose
other interesting positions to consider.

Just my $AU0.02 worth!

M@

* Yes I know "safe" is a relative term in this context, but youget the idea! :-)

On 28 April 2010 18:13, Cian Brennan <cian.brennan () redbrick dcu ie> wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 11:12:40AM -0500, Fetch, Brandon wrote:
> > Too late:
> > http://files.cloudprivacy.net/ssl-mitm.pdf
> >
> > And these devices are already in deployment...now, imagine one of these with a wildcard certificate running at a 
> > coffee house, or at the aggregation point within a provider's CO POP...
> Where it would generate cert errors for every user?
>
> These only make sense where you can install the proxy's wildcard cert on all of
> the client machines. Neither coffee houes, nor ISPs can do this.
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: firewall-wizards-bounces () listserv icsalabs com [mailto:firewall-wizards-bounces () listserv icsalabs com] 
> > On Behalf Of John Morrison
> > Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2010 5:45 AM
> > To: Firewall Wizards Security Mailing List
> > Cc: mjr () ranum com; Firewall Wizards Security Mailing List
> > Subject: Re: [fw-wiz] Firewall best practices
> >
> > My understanding of https (and other PKI-based encryption) is that
> > only the holder of the private key can decrypt the data encrypted with
> > the other (public) key in the pair. My view is that the firewall can
> > only decrypt and inspect https traffic if it is acting as the server
> > to the external client. It can't intercept and decrypt https traffic
> > destined for another device - the real server. If it did https would
> > be worthless. Any hacker could buy such a firewall to sniff and
> > decrypt all https traffic.
> >
> > On 23 April 2010 20:18,  <david () lang hm> wrote:
> > > On Fri, 23 Apr 2010, Martin Barry wrote:
> > >
> > > > $quoted_author = "Marcus J. Ranum" ;
> > > > > That's why firewalls need to go back to doing what they
> > > > > originally did, and parsing/analyzying the traffic that
> > > > > flows through them, rather than "stateful packet
> > > > > inspection" (which, as far as I can tell, means that
> > > > > there's a state-table entry saying "I saw SYN!")
> > > >
> > > > Marcus, are you referring to DPI or proxies or both or something else
> > > > entirely?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > If the firewall doesn't understand the data it's passing,
> > > > > it's not a firewall, it's a hub.
> > > >
> > > > If an application emulates HTTPS traffic and is proxy aware, how do you
> > > > tell
> > > > the difference?
> > >
> > > There are firewalls on the market that can decrypt HTTPS traffic (and I
> > > believe be configured to block any traffic that they can't decrypt)
> > >
> > > David Lang
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > firewall-wizards mailing list
> > > firewall-wizards () listserv icsalabs com
> > > https://listserv.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
> > _______________________________________________
> > firewall-wizards mailing list
> > firewall-wizards () listserv icsalabs com
> > https://listserv.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
> >
> > This message is intended only for the person(s) to which it is addressed
> > and may contain privileged, confidential and/or insider information..
> > If you have received this communication in error, please notify us
> > immediately by replying to the message and deleting it from your computer.
> > Any disclosure, copying, distribution, or the taking of any action concerning
> > the contents of this message and any attachment(s) by anyone other
> > than the named recipient(s) is strictly prohibited.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > firewall-wizards mailing list
> > firewall-wizards () listserv icsalabs com
> > https://listserv.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
>
> --
>
> --
> _______________________________________________
> firewall-wizards mailing list
> firewall-wizards () listserv icsalabs com
> https://listserv.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards



-- 
"Some things are eternal by nature,
others by consequence"
_______________________________________________
firewall-wizards mailing list
firewall-wizards () listserv icsalabs com
https://listserv.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards