Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives
Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy
From: Joel Rosenblatt <joel () COLUMBIA EDU>
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2010 16:22:03 -0400
I have to say that your argument falls apart if you start looking at the mechanisms that the passwords are being compromised by: 1) keyloggers 2) phishing Neither of these are really mitigated by changing the password every 90 days, or for that matter, changing it at all.Password changing is on a check list that the auditors have .. and that's why your changing it - if you can convince them that it doesn't really help, they you don't have to change it unless it gets compromised.
We monitor all authenticated logins on all servers and look for compromised accounts - they come from phishing or from logging in from a questionable system. Most compromised accounts are used to send spam or to steal library resources - both are detected by automated processes we have in place. We have seen that stolen accounts are typically used within hours or even minutes of the compromise.
For my money, I believe that the only way to semi-solve this problem is to implement a two factor authentication system - which we have done for most central system administrators. I would like to do this for everyone - it's only a simple matter of money.
My 2 cents Joel Rosenblatt Joel Rosenblatt, Manager Network & Computer Security Columbia Information Security Office (CISO) Columbia University, 612 W 115th Street, NY, NY 10025 / 212 854 3033 http://www.columbia.edu/~joel --On Friday, September 24, 2010 3:31 PM -0400 Dexter Caldwell <Dexter.Caldwell () FURMAN EDU> wrote:
I have to agree. On this issue, I view password aging as simply a part of a set of tools for managing passwords. Because of the changes in password threats over the years- one thing seems clear. If we as an industry fail to to use any of our very few defense methods, the attackers will soon figure it out and eventually it will become a point of weakness if for no other reason that it becomes an easier entry point as other methods are shored up against attack. With respect to auditors, we all need auditors to help drive security initiatives to some degree and add weight or perspective to our recommendations, however, I try to to keep in mind, I are not here to argue brute force statistical differences in password quality or the mathematical superiority of one adjustment or another. I am here to provide a means of real world protection to the organization. Any exposure potentially puts at risk everyone in an entire system and at worst everyone in the entire organization not to mention the enterprise (non-person related) business data that the system may hold. In that sense, once I'm within compliance (legal, auditor, or what have you)- then it doesn't matter what the auditors say. What matters to me is how can I best protect the assets I'm focused on. My logic is really quite simple. I want a balanced security policy that protects my organization and does not itself become the greater threat. Imho, password changes help do that in one major way. They reduce the time of exposure. They do not or may not prevent the risk of exposure. Nevertheless, there are other tools for that. The other thing password changes provide is that they can be a tool that is one of your best and most basic security awareness initiative altogether in that they get people thinking about security and their access if only once a year, once every 6 months, once a month- whatever works for you. When managed properly password changes I think increase your protection and help influence awareness. If I had 5 live-in guests in my house each of which had their own different key to my home, and I knew that regardless of my preaching, that occasionsly someone would distribute an unauthorized key, or lose their key, or that the house gets broken into with no signs of forced entry, then I might feel that changing locks and distributing new keys occasionaly was not a bad thing. It might not increase lock strength, but that's not the point. The point is if I've been compromised and I know that my whole house was violated, it helps me have greater assurance that when my house was entered that 1 the exposed key no longer works and two, if they copied other keys lying around compromised other locks, I know that it won't be that way forever. In other words, for my situation, they add a significant layer of protection to my home to be worth the some effort. But that effort itself is a configurable variable to some degree. I might not change the locks every thirty days (high effort) unless I had a breakin or attempted breakin events happening with a frequency that warranted that change. A good balance might be every 6 months (lower cost, lower impact, etc.) If I had a thousand locks and a higher frequency of attack or exposure, I might see fit to put more effort into changing locks because of the greater cost and likelihood of the risk of exposure. At least then I have a policy that 1) provides reasonable security without throwing away tools. 2) Have a policy I can defend in the event we have have a serious costly security event and every know-it-all security pundit in the world begins to question every thing we do with phrases like 'gross negligence' and "Well everyone knows..." and "best practices indicate...30 days,but this organization had NO CHANGE POLICY WHATSOEVER?!" All this to say in my opinion we spend too much time debating things and trying to prove things that are not worth proving. It's just common sense that at the very least password changes reduce an exposed password, therefore it seems to me to be a good tool for controlling that particular variable of security threats and that is what I use it for. Therefore it's irrelevant whether or how much it impacts entropy. The real problem is that passwords are and outdated form of security in the first place, but there are not many fully developed alternatives that globally provide the same ease of use, ability to work with all of our applications (and users), at similarly reasonable cost of management as usernames and passwords. The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv <SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU> writes:I agreed with this line of thinking in 199[78], before watching intruders hand-code password-recording trojaned versions of sshd and ssh on rooted UNIX systems during the course of an investigation. The code did a nice job of host/client/account/password capture and loggin, which was *way* more efficient than the ad-hoc telnet/pop/ftp packet sniffers of the day. In the current environment of rampant keyloggers and man-in-the-browser crimeware, I'm completely over the line of thinking that the best way to get credentials is to attack a server's store of them. I think the bad guys have pretty much moved on, as well. Grudgingly, I come to agreement with the Standard Audit Advice, though not for the reasons it was written in the first place. I see it as a hygienic measure; way to reap compromised credentials *eventually*, rather than letting them go on indefinitely, somewhat sooner rather than later for some classes of accountholders. Given how easy it is to steal credentials client-side, you may actually force a change before it gets used (due to the size of the pile of booty), though I certainly wouldn't depend on that. I don't know whether that puts me on the white or black side of the issue. :-) -jmlRoger Safian <r-safian () NORTHWESTERN EDU> 2010-09-24 09:31 >>>I'd suggest that password aging should be based on the risk that somebody could obtain, and crack, the password hashes. It's not a black and white issue, regardless of what the Auditors, Spaf, or I say about it. -----Original Message----- From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Valdis Kletnieks Sent: Friday, September 24, 2010 7:53 AM To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy On Fri, 24 Sep 2010 08:28:02 EDT, Barbara Deschapelles said:We currently require all, Students, Faculty and Staff, to change passwords every 90 days and we are enforcing unique passwords (no repeats). This is a relatively new requirement here and we are getting a lot of push back on the change. I'd like to get a feel for what people accept as current best practice for password change intervals and other related policies, and also, if it is different than the best practice what people are actually doing (if you wish to share that :-)There's "what everybody is doing because auditors insist" and "what actually makes sense in today's computing environment". Make sure to read what Gene Spafford wrote about it: http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/site/blog/post/password-change-myths/ http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/site/blog/post/passwords-and-myth/ (Anybody want to publicly admit they were able to sell the auditors on what Spaf said, and managed to eliminate mandatory changes?)
Joel Rosenblatt, Manager Network & Computer Security Columbia Information Security Office (CISO) Columbia University, 612 W 115th Street, NY, NY 10025 / 212 854 3033 http://www.columbia.edu/~joel
Current thread:
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy, (continued)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Scott O. Bradner (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Roger Safian (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Dave Koontz (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Koski, David (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy John Ladwig (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Jack Reardon (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy John Ladwig (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Dexter Caldwell (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Doty, Timothy T. (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Dexter Caldwell (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Joel Rosenblatt (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy John Ladwig (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Joel Rosenblatt (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Doty, Timothy T. (Sep 24)
- Re: Current Best Practice regarding Password Change policy Jack Reardon (Sep 24)