Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives

Re: IRC, IM Proxy Implementations


From: Richard Gadsden <gadsden () MUSC EDU>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2004 08:58:23 -0400

On Thu, 2 Sep 2004, Dave Monnier, IT Security Office, Indiana University wrote:

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Richard Gadsden wrote:
We've already seen bots using non-standard ports for their IRC traffic.

Blocking of the standard IRC ports by some sites has had an unintended
consequence, namely, it has introduced a selective pressure into the
environment, forcing the bot coders to adapt by adding support for
non-standard ports, in the process making their bots harder to detect.

Having feared (and now having observed) this adaptation, we've resisted
the urge to block the standard IRC ports, believing that any benefit would
likely be short-lived, and not worth the pain.


In our experience we've found the opposite, they're now considerably
easier to detect as they're the only traffic.  Prior to the block, we
also had to sort through the legitimate IRC traffic as well.

Cheers,
- -Dave

Granted, that is true. But what about the "stealthier" bot species that
have since, in order to evade the port block countermeasure, moved their
IRC traffic flows to non-standard ports? Are you able to detect those IRC
traffic flows?

I see the short-term value of blocking the standard ports (and it sounds
like it's been a win for IU), but the gains are already being eroded as
the bots "evolve" into using non-standard ports...  and as Morrow has just
suggested, if/when encryption of the bots' IRC flows becomes common,
detecting these flows will be even more difficult :-(

Thanks,
Richard

 --- o ---
 Richard Gadsden
 Chief Information Security Officer
 Medical University of South Carolina

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