Re: Please do not change your password

[Paul Kendall <PKendall () ACCUDATASYSTEMS COM>]

A rather simplistic answer posted to a Yahoo group, I must admit. We are talking as though this is the only line of 
defense in the toolbox. And while there are better solutions out there, we see far too many instances where they are 
not deployed. Which brings us back to the password issue. And frequently, it doesn't take key-loggers or social 
reconnaissance exercises to extract this information. Remember, the vast majority of attacks occur from within. 
Executives are notorious for not wanting to change passwords. So, over time, lots of folks gain potential access by 
simply knowing what the CFO/COO/CEO password is. Not to mention the casual 'password pick-up' by simply listening to 
folks or even shoulder-surfing. (which means folks are very likely not paying attention to their surroundings they way 
they should).

Security awareness is also crucial to some success here as well. I estimate (based on a lot of years working with all 
types of clients) that fewer than 7% do a reasonable job at security awareness training. There is no one specific 
reason for this - I can't say it is due primarily to one thing over another. Corporate 'check-boxing' certainly plays a 
role in it. Universities have their own unique issues to deal with here, which I won't even attempt to elaborate upon - 
you know situation well enough already.

The bottom line remains the fact that regulatory bodies mandate it. The article failed to mention this. The users will 
be asking 'why' for while. You folks had better things to do than respond to users on this issue. Chris Null didn't do 
you any favors.

Paul
========================================
Paul L. Kendall, CGEIT, CHS-III, CISM, CISSP, CSSLP
Accudata Systems, Inc.


-----Original Message-----
From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Mike 
Porter
Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2010 9:13 AM
To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Please do not change your password

On Wed, 14 Apr 2010, Paul Kendall wrote:

> Password changes also stop a practice that was not mentioned here
> - corporate espionage. If I have an executive or middle management
> userid and password, I can snoop on the system, steal email and
> other files, and in general make life interesting. In addition, I
> can go undetected (if I am careful) for as long as the password is
> valid. Frequent password changes help stop this practice, which is a
> lot more common than you might think.

Changing the password accomplishes little unless the method used
for obtaining the password is also fixed.  If the user responded
to a phish, will they fall for it again?  If they have a keylogger
installed, won't it just log the new password?

Last login and location of login is a valuble tool for combating the
above scenario.  Login auditing and location checking can also raise
security alerts.  In short, there are better ways to deal with this
than forcing the user to change their password from Afk04kbg to
Afk05kbg once every month.

...

Mike

Mike Porter
Systems Programmer V
IT/NSS
University of Delaware

> Paul
> ========================================
> Paul L. Kendall, PhD, CGEIT, CHS-III, CISM, CISSP, CSSLP
> Accudata Systems, Inc.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of John 
> Ladwig
> Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2010 8:27 AM
> To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
> Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Please do not change your password
>
> Unlikely that it'll change the audit book.
>
> Nor should it, necessarily.  The study is really predicated on consumer accounts, and doesn't address duty of care 
> issues for data custodians, among other things.  I've rarely seen that mentioned over the last five months' 
> discussion, since the paper was published.
>
> One particularly acute point on this topic is the paper's assertion that financial fraud loses the use nothing.  
> While true for some financial accounts situations for personal accounts, that is demonstrably not true for US 
> commercial online bank accounts (see Krebsonsecurity.com for many examples), and as I recall isn't true for all 
> personal banking accounts in other countries.
>
> All that said, it's a goodish paper, and we've all known that passwords are horrid for well over a decade, but 
> substantial progress on password replacement is pretty poor, overall.
>
>    -jml
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Justin Sherenco
> Sent: 2010-04-14 08:04:59
> To: Justin Sherenco;The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv
> Cc:
> Subject: [SECURITY] Please do not change your password
>
>
> Hello,
>
> I came across an interesting article on password changes.  Author Cormac
> Herley of Microsoft makes a good case albeit just a cost-benefit analysis.
> I had to go back and think of why these types of policies were created in
> the first place.  I came to my own conclusion that they were created
> before the days of complex password (passphrase) enforcement and the
> ability to automatically lock out accounts after X amount of failed log-in
> attempts.
>
>
>
> Do you think he can convince the auditors?
>
>
>
>
>
>
> <http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/04/11/please_do_not
> _change_your_password/?page=full>
> http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/04/11/please_do_not_
> change_your_password/?page=full
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Justin
>
>
>
>
>
> -------------------------------------
>
> Justin Sherenco
>
> Security Analyst
>
> 734-487-8574
>
> Easten Michigan University
>
> http://it.emich.edu/security

-
Mike Porter
PGP Fingerprint: F4 AE E1 9F 67 F7 DA EA  2F D2 37 F3 99 ED D1 C2