Re: Please do not change your password

[Mike Porter <mike () UDEL EDU>]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2010, Doty, Timothy T. wrote:

> You say that passwords are no longer cracked? Then read up on the compromise
> the Apache folks had where the database of (unsalted) hashed passwords was
> obtained by the hackers. That is only a single case, but it is very recent
> and IMO very relevant. Those 8-char passwords are little better than plain
> text in such a situation.

An unsalted password is not a good choice and does not prove
anything with regard to the current discussion.  And in any case, it
is well understood that access to the hashed passwords can easily
lead to a compromise.  While longer passwords are harder to crack,
once you have the hashes, it really becomes a matter of how much
money you can afford to throw at the problem - or how many bots you
have that you can set to chewing on the problem.

So, yes, getting access to the hashed passwords is a gold mine, but
most compromises are phishes, other forms of social engineering, or
keyloggers installed via socially engineering viruses (ohhh!  I have
a package, must install this .exe to find out about it), or hacked
websites.

A few weeks ago, the website for a local paper was hacked.  It is
the sort of paper that most local politicians or their assistants
would read.  If they had unpatched systems, many of the local
politicians could have had their passwords stolen and access to
their email be had by those who wanted it.  This could have made for
a nice package of information for someone willing to pay for it and
make use of it locally.  However, most likely the accounts were just
harvested for spam and credit card info.  But, in any case, password
length and lifetime does not figure into equation very well.

> If the bad guys "just worked around" passwords why would they care to obtain
> a hash list? The argument is short sighted and misses the value of defense
> in depth.

Mike

Mike Porter
Systems Programer V
IT/NSS
University of Delaware

> Tim Doty
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv
> > [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of SCHALIP, MICHAEL
> > Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2010 8:43 AM
> > To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
> > Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Please do not change your password
> >
> > Have there been any studies recently that have identified the net
> > effects of "long passwords" or passphrases?....or complex passwords?
> > Before coming to higher ed, I came from the "sensitive" Fed sector -
> > and they used 8-char passwords that were generated for you -
> > upper/lower case, and one number, (and they used a cool little routine
> > in the password generator that made the passwords "pseudo-
> > pronounceable" so that they were easier to remember.)
> >
> > I also remember asking why they weren't required to use passwords that
> > were longer, more complex, etc - and the answer was: "Passwords keep
> > honest people honest - the vast majority (if not all) of compromised
> > accounts have not come about by the way of 'cracked passwords' - they
> > have come about by the capturing or surrendering of legitimate
> > passwords.  Captured through malware or bogus websites - Surrendered
> > through phishing or social engineering means."  I was skeptical until I
> > started doing some research on my own - and I couldn't find more than
> > 1-2 obscure instances where a password was actually 'cracked' - most
> > were cases where passwords were immaterial, and the system was
> > compromised by "going around the password" altogether.
> >
> > So - this does beg the question - even though longer passwords are
> > theoretically harder to "crack", who cares....the bad guys are just
> > going to go around them anyway....?
> >
> > Thoughts?  And thanks for the discussion....
> >
> > Michael
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv
> > [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of John Ladwig
> > Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2010 7:27 AM
> > To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
> > Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Please do not change your password
> >
> > Unlikely that it'll change the audit book.
> >
> > Nor should it, necessarily.  The study is really predicated on consumer
> > accounts, and doesn't address duty of care issues for data custodians,
> > among other things.  I've rarely seen that mentioned over the last five
> > months' discussion, since the paper was published.
> >
> > One particularly acute point on this topic is the paper's assertion
> > that financial fraud loses the use nothing.  While true for some
> > financial accounts situations for personal accounts, that is
> > demonstrably not true for US commercial online bank accounts (see
> > Krebsonsecurity.com for many examples), and as I recall isn't true for
> > all personal banking accounts in other countries.
> >
> > All that said, it's a goodish paper, and we've all known that passwords
> > are horrid for well over a decade, but substantial progress on password
> > replacement is pretty poor, overall.
> >
> >     -jml
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Justin Sherenco
> > Sent: 2010-04-14 08:04:59
> > To: Justin Sherenco;The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv
> > Cc:
> > Subject: [SECURITY] Please do not change your password
> >
> >
> > Hello,
> >
> > I came across an interesting article on password changes.  Author
> > Cormac
> > Herley of Microsoft makes a good case albeit just a cost-benefit
> > analysis.
> > I had to go back and think of why these types of policies were created
> > in
> > the first place.  I came to my own conclusion that they were created
> > before the days of complex password (passphrase) enforcement and the
> > ability to automatically lock out accounts after X amount of failed
> > log-in
> > attempts.
> >
> >
> >
> > Do you think he can convince the auditors?
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > <http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/04/11/please_do_
> > not
> > _change_your_password/?page=full>
> > http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/04/11/please_do_n
> > ot_
> > change_your_password/?page=full
> >
> >
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > Justin
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -------------------------------------
> >
> > Justin Sherenco
> >
> > Security Analyst
> >
> > 734-487-8574
> >
> > Easten Michigan University
> >
> > http://it.emich.edu/security
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
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-
Mike Porter
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