Re: stopping students sharing their login credentials

[randy marchany <marchany () VT EDU>]

Don't get me wrong. There needs to be some sort of "control" in a
policy or standard. The control has to be enforceable,however. If not,
people will ignore the policy. The "personal responsibility" item
provides that control.

Your speed limit example is good but given the information available
in computer logs, the speeding violation would be "Randy's car was
speeding but we don't know who the driver was" so we can't give a
ticket out because we can't identify the individual who was actually
driving. Remember, computer login logs (your only evidence of account
login) only show the userid and not the person.

 At least, with the responsibility clause, it'd be "Randy's car was
speeding and Randy is responsible for its use and therefore
accountable". Car insurance companies follow this strategy to some
degree. The computer logs would show Randy's userid was used and the
policy states that Randy is responsible for its use. You have an
actual person to "interview".

-r.

On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 10:52 AM, James M. Dutcher - Assoc. VP IS/IT &
CIO <james.dutcher () sunyorange edu> wrote:
> Randy, et al,
>
> I would like to offer a counter point.  I believe that there has to be a
> policy in place. Otherwise, anyone can contest that "they did not know" or "
> you did not say that I could not do it".  Having a policy protects the
> organization.
>
> Yes you are correct that it is difficult if not impossible to
> police/enforce, especially in real time.  However, when there are
> digressions encountered/discovered, then the appropriate actions take place
> and the diggressors are then the examples (and precedents) as to what
> happens when policies are broken.
>
> Take for example highway "speed limits".  There is not enough
> police/surveillance in place to ensure that everyone complies with it.  But
> there is some in place to catch folks so as to (hopefully) keep the rest of
> the drivers in compliance.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jim
>
> James M. Dutcher - PMP, CISSP, SCP/Security+, CISA
> SUNY Orange - Associate Vice President of Info. Tech. Services & CIO
> 845-341-4651 (office)
> 845-742-8954 (college cell)
> 607-760-7455 (personal cell)
> james.dutcher () sunyorange edu
> jim () dutcher net
> Yahoo IM: jmdutche
> Google Talk: jmdutche
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 10:32 AM, randy marchany <marchany () vt edu> wrote:
> > One should never put in a policy/standard any item that can not be
> > enforced. While the spirit of the statement "you must not share your
> > userid, login credentials with anyone" is certainly clear, the reality
> > is that this cannot be enforced without additional monitoring such as
> > 2 factor authentication, video feeds or witnesses. The most common
> > "abuse" of this would be a simple login and computer logs cannot show
> > that a userid was shared or WHO the person was that actually logged
> > into the system. Biometrics isn't foolproof since I could login with
> > my biometrics and let you use my userid. Card swipe access isn't
> > foolproof since people form trains to enter a facility. Shoot, I
> > remember visiting a campus, going to a pizza place right across the
> > street and seeing the building access code written on a piece of paper
> > on the bulletin board next to the cash register. Apparently, that
> > pizza place delivered a lot of pizzas to labs in the building :-). So
> > the "must not share" clause is basically unenforceable and weakens
> > your policy/standard. Another way to express the intent of the clause
> > is needed.
> >
> > Why do people share these things? Could be something as simple as the
> > site doesn't have a mechanism for guest access. An example of this is
> > guest wireless access on campus. You have a guest speaker who needs
> > wireless access, your campus has no mechanism to provide guest access
> > so you, the sponsor, lets the speaker use your credentials to get
> > access. Email access, door access are other examples. An email system
> > doesn't allow sharing of email folders, a dept. head is on travel and
> > the assistant needs access to those emails. The only alternative is to
> > share the email password.
> >
> > So, how do we fix this? The best solution I found was to state "you
> > are responsible for whatever activities originate from your userid,
> > computer, id card..." (feel free to include whatever
> > authentication/authorization mechanism you have). This is easily
> > enforceable. Computer and access control logs note the "userid/token"
> > that was used to gain entry. SInce you can identify the owner, that
> > person is responsible for its use.
> >
> > I do believe having the "responsible for its use" strategy is more
> > effective.
> >
> > In Russell's case, the access logs contain the name of the card owner.
> > You contact the card owner and ask them the necessary questions :-).
> >
> >
> > Just my .02.
> >
> > Randy Marchany
> > VA Tech IT Security Office and Lab
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Jan 22, 2009 at 9:25 PM, Russell Fulton <r.fulton () auckland ac nz>
> > wrote:
> > > Background:
> > >
> > > Earlier this week we had an incident where the building security officer
> > > noticed a group of unfamiliar people using machines in one of our labs.
> > >  She
> > > asked them for their ID cards and none could (would?) produce one.  On
> > > questioning they said they were students from a neighbouring institution
> > > and
> > > that they were using "borrowed" credential.
> > >
> > > We have cctv footage and swipe card logs from the door (which may show
> > > they
> > > tail gated someone in).   We are now tracking down which machines were
> > > being
> > > used so we can disable the accounts.
> > >
> > > To the point.
> > >
> > > We (the security techies) have been asked what measures we can deploy to
> > > prevent this sort of thing happening in future.
> > >
> > > We already do lots of education, posters, page on the back of the
> > > student
> > > handbook. Students have no excuse for not knowing that they should not
> > > share
> > > passwords.
> > >
> > > On the social/education side we could make an example of anyone we
> > > finger
> > > for this (assuming we can make charges stick) in the hope that this will
> > > persuade other students not to share their passwords.
> > >
> > > Technical solutions seem to revolve around some form of two factor
> > > authentication.  I.e. something the student has but which they will be
> > > reluctant to part with for any length of time.  Like their ID card.
> > >
> > > Our ID cards have bar codes and classic mag stripe.   Some labs (like
> > > this
> > > one) also have proximity card locks.  Generally only post grad students
> > > or
> > > students in special coursed (like medicine) have proximity cards.
> > >
> > > Anyway I would very much like to know what other are doing in this
> > > space.
> > >
> > > Cheers, Russell