Re: [privacy] U.S. Government to Ask Courts to Toss Phone

[coderman <coderman () gmail com>]

On 6/12/06, Lindsey, Ben J <ben.lindsey () centerpointenergy com> wrote:
> ...
>   When it comes to tapping international phone calls that the "government" (whoever that may be) feels are made 
> to/from possible terrorists, I have to admit this doesn't particularly bother me.  I consider that it's a time of war 
> and if it ever puts me out in some manner, it's the least I can do.

here's a different question: are there different types of "at war" to
consider?  the war on terrorism is like the war on drugs; it will
never be "won", only mitigated to varying degree.

how comfortable are you with a continued "state of war" where the
battlefield is the american homeland (and the resulting military
intelligence directed at domestic targets)?

this is really the crux of the debate: how much legal authority was
granted to the executive in this situation when we formally entered a
"war on terrorism".



>   Domestic calls are a slightly different ball of wax to me.
>
>   On the one hand I have no problem with my phone records (who I called and who called me) being sent to the 
> government.  As a former ELINT/SIGINT specialist, I understand the wealth of information which can be gleaned from 
> this once you have identified a particular bad guy/terrorist via some other means. (international calls to UBL for 
> instance:)) So many times we wished we had known the endpoints of traffic we handled, and God knows what we missed 
> because of it.  But I also have to add that this is really only acceptable to me during wartime or when there are 
> perhaps grave national security concerns.

call data records and endpoint analysis are probably here to stay.
there is precedent for dialed numbers / pen registers.  i was a little
confused over the daytona / carrier CDR's deal since this is much less
interesting than the deep inspection by the narus equipment for
example.


>   However, unless I am talking to a suspected terrorist, I cannot accept for any reason the monitoring of my domestic 
> telephone calls without warrant.  Sure, I don't care who knows what number I dialed -- but what was said during the 
> call was personal and private.  I know how many people have access to the phone record data already, so I'm not 
> particularly bothered if the NSA (or other appropriate agency) wants it for their database.

agreed.  and this hints at another problem: how much privacy invasion
has been offloaded to commercial data providers.  ChoicePoint and
Acxiom and the smaller (often more shady) companies get some heat now
and then, but not nearly as much as deserved.


>   The views expressed (in general) on these matters in the list seem (to me) to indicate that nothing of the above is 
> acceptable at any time without the standard warrant process -- whether there is previous precedent for it or not.  
> Things much worse (in the eavesdropping vein) have taken place during (and outside of) national emergencies in the 
> past, but there seemed to be no media talking it up (or complaints) until this current action.

can you provide some examples of the much worse that went unnoticed?

to me the biggest issues are:
1. intentionally bypassing FISA (with an apparent recognition that
approval would be refused)
2. taking programs denied in congress (TIA) into deep black rather
than terminating them.
3. structuring highly classified/compartmentalized programs with as
little oversight as possible.

the daytona database and call data record analysis is much less
interesting or concerning than the domestic call eavesdropping
(purportedly if one end is foreign, though this is in doubt) and the
deep packet inspection of data communication (narus taps, etc).


>   Further:  If you are in the US, but not a citizen (or diplomat of some kind) -- should I care if the NSA listens to 
> *every* word you say on the phone?
>
>   Am I misreading everyone (because really its not just this list, I am not pointing fingers -- again, just seeking 
> clarity about the issue and views surrounding it) -- or am I in a state of misunderstanding about what is (or perhaps 
> the depth of what is) going on?

perhaps i misunderstood; the domestic eavesdropping involved citizens,
not foreign nationals on US soil.  is that what you meant by the above
with regards to diplomats in the US?

as far as the list goes, i think most of the concern is about keeping
the proper oversight and accountability in place when surveillance is
used.  the recent Canadian incidents are a good of example of how
useful good intelligence can be for protecting the public.  but
contrary to giving the spies a blank check, i think this underscores
the need to keep them (the intelligence agencies) well within the
bounds of the law and continually under reputable oversight /
accountability processes so that they can continue to be effective.

lack of accountability only breeds abuses and incompetence to the
detriment of legitimate uses of these services.

for example trying to find terrorists with profiling (the TIA
programs) is theoretically and empirically ineffective and counter
productive, as evidenced by the flood of worthless leads turned over
to the FBI by this program and the inherent limits of such statistical
profiling to identify such a small subset of the population (the
terrorists).  this is an example of a program that is worthless and
should not be implemented, yet continues on despite the will of
congress and without sufficient oversight and probably outside the
legal boundary of reasonable search.

and last but not least, i am strong advocate of personal
responsibility for your own privacy.  if you are concerned about your
data communication being sifted and filtered through, implement end to
end privacy with any number of available tools and support projects
and efforts to do so.
(defeating endpoint / social network analysis requires zero knowledge
mixing, which is much more complicated and latent)
_______________________________________________
privacy mailing list
privacy () whitestar linuxbox org
http://www.whitestar.linuxbox.org/mailman/listinfo/privacy