IDS mailing list archives
RE: IDS evaluations procedures
From: "Nathan Davidson" <ndavidso () globix com>
Date: Sat, 16 Jul 2005 07:29:19 -0400
Hi Adam, I am sure Tim can answer this one very well, but over the last 12 months I have spent a lot of time working with IPS in an IDS orientated company. So I thought I share my experiences. When we deploy an in-line IPS solution we define a number of parameters in the policy that should be present in ALL valid requests (White-listing). I use this to filter out all traffic that I know must be malicious. From my experience this is up to 95% of worm/scan traffic. We then apply IDS style signatures based on known attack vectors (Black-listing) but only on the remaining 5% of traffic. Thus we should have up to 95% less false positives (and generally we do). Additional benefits can be gained by dropping all subsequent packets from an abusing source IP address. An example would be to use an IPS to force all HTTP requests to have the host header www.xyz.com (your sites URL) this will stop a significant proportion of HTTP noise before signature matching. Conversely with IDS you just don’t have the ability to white list traffic in this way, I guess you could RST any request that didn’t match the URL but I think fragmented buffer overflows and the like could sneak through - so it’s risky. As you alluded to, the IPS signatures tend to be less aggressive than those on the IDS which I think reflects the much higher penalty of false positives on an in-line blocking device. For this reason I do still deploy NIDS/HIDS on the inside to collect forensic data, with the added benefit of having a second manufacturers signatures. Internet I IPS I Firewall I I Switch=== NIDS I I HIDS Server Hope that helps Nathan Davidson Senior Architect Globix Corp. London -----Original Message----- From: Adam Powers [mailto:apowers () lancope com] Sent: Wed 13/07/2005 19:00 To: THolman () toplayer com; David.Sames () sparta com; focus-ids () securityfocus com Cc: Subject: Re: IDS evaluations procedures Tim, I hate to stir up this whole can of worms (pun alert) and yes I know this is off topic but can you please qualify this seemingly non sequitur statement? "All IDS devices are subject to large numbers of false positives, which is why if you're making a new investment you should consider IPS technology, as this gives you a far lower TCO and real-world protection against zero-day threats." How so? I really struggle with this whole "because it's inline it must be more accurate" thing. Sure, if I turn off a bunch of sigs on the IPS that are less reliable, accuracy will increase. But why not do the same thing on the non-inline IDS? Is there something magical about being inline that makes the system less prone to false positives? If so, what? ---------- David, addressing your original question... (which, incidentally, was about INTERNAL attack traffic, not Internet Storm Center quality stuff that's randomly hitting the outside of your firewall), we'll need a few extra data points. 1. What are you testing for? Traffic-based anomalies? Application level RFC violations and anomalies? Relational-modeling anomalies? Behavioral-anomalies? 2. What collection mechanism is employed? NetFlow? sFlow? Ethernet Frames? Other? 3. Are you only interested in classic "attacks" (fire up Nessus, see what happens) or other anomalies such as malfunctioning applications, policy-driven anomalies, etc? On 7/13/05 3:33 AM, "THolman () toplayer com" <THolman () toplayer com> wrote:
Hi Dave, Take a peek at the Internet Storm Centre @ SANS - http://isc.sans.org/ Gives you a good idea about what's going on. Which IDS devices are you looking at? All IDS devices are subject to large numbers of false positives, which is why if you're making a new investment you should consider IPS technology, as this gives you a far lower TCO and real-world protection against zero-day threats. It also saves you having to buy lots of IDS sensors, seeming a large proportion of the load will be absorbed and taken care of by the IPS. Just my 2 cents.. ;) Cheers, Tim -----Original Message----- From: Sames, David [mailto:David.Sames () sparta com] Sent: 13 July 2005 04:54 To: THolman () toplayer com Subject: RE: IDS evaluations procedures Thanks for the info - those are exactly the kinds of characteristics I need to consider - at this point, I'm not evaluating a product per se - I'm evaluating some claims by some of our researchers :-) FP's are what I'm most concerned about. I'll check things out to see if I can get more stats - and of attempt to produce some data sets that may look like "anomalies" but are really traffic spikes and shouldn't be flagged.To specifically answer your question, look at current attack weather reports - you'll see approximately 15-20% of perimeter traffic is in fact worms trying to propagate. Any evaluation should be designed with this in mind. ..but more importantly, make sure you're evaluating something that will do the job in hand and doesn't lead you up the garden path with inaccurate marketing collateral! :) <<< That's exactly what I was looking for ! Regards, Dave -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- Re: IDS evaluations procedures, (continued)
- Re: IDS evaluations procedures Joel Esler (Jul 13)
- Re: IDS evaluations procedures Fergus Brooks (Jul 15)
- Re: IDS evaluations procedures Whodini (Jul 15)
- RE: IDS evaluations procedures THolman (Jul 13)
- RE: IDS evaluations procedures THolman (Jul 13)
- Re: IDS evaluations procedures Adam Powers (Jul 15)
- Re: IDS evaluations procedures Justin . Ross (Jul 17)
- RE: IDS evaluations procedures Omar Herrera (Jul 17)
- Re: IDS evaluations procedures Adam Powers (Jul 15)
- RE: IDS evaluations procedures Nathan Davidson (Jul 15)
- RE: IDS evaluations procedures Sames, David (Jul 15)
- RE: IDS evaluations procedures Nathan Davidson (Jul 17)
- Re: IDS evaluations procedures Adam Powers (Jul 17)
- Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures) Devdas Bhagat (Jul 18)
- Re: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures) Richard Bejtlich (Jul 20)
- Re: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures) Devdas Bhagat (Jul 21)
- Re: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures) Richard Bejtlich (Jul 22)
- Re: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures) Nick Black (Jul 21)
- Re: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures) Richard Bejtlich (Jul 21)
- Re: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures) Fergus Brooks (Jul 22)
- RE: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures) Mike Barkett (Jul 22)
- Re: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures) Fergus Brooks (Jul 20)