IDS mailing list archives

Re: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS


From: Martin Roesch <roesch () sourcefire com>
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2003 22:29:48 -0500

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No whitepapers, but the capability is pretty self evident if you understand how Snort works. I suppose I should probably write something up one of these days...

     -Marty

On Tuesday, February 11, 2003, at 03:16 PM, Curt Purdy wrote:

Are there any whitepapers on this capability?

Also, I thought your panel discussion at D.C. SANS was great. Liked hearing what it is like straight from the entrepreneurial horses mouth, so to speak
;)

Curt Purdy CISSP, MCSE+I, CNE, CCDA
Senior Systems Engineer
Information Security Engineer
DP Solutions
cpurdy () dpsol com

----------------------------------------

If you spend more on coffee than on IT security, you will be hacked.
What's more, you deserve to be hacked.
-- White House cybersecurity adviser Richard Clarke


-----Original Message-----
From: Martin Roesch [mailto:roesch () sourcefire com]
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2003 8:05 PM
To: slyph () alum mit edu
Cc: focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: Re: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS


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Just as an FYI, Snort can do protocol anomaly detection, through it's
rules-based engine, it's decoder and in its preprocessors.  Protocol
anomalies mean different things to different people, of course, so it
depends on what you're really looking for.

People commonly think of Snort as a "signature based" IDS only, it's
actually capable of a lot more than that...

      -Marty


On Tuesday, February 4, 2003, at 11:07 PM, Michael L. Artz wrote:

I am trying to supplement our existing signature based IDS (Snort,
gotta love open source) with a protocol anomaly based one in a fairly
large enterprise network.  I am in the fairly early stages of
research, so I guess that the first question would be, is it worth it?

I hear the anomaly detection buzzword thrown around a lot these days,
and can't quite get past all the marketing hype.  From what I can
tell, protocol anomaly detection seems to be the more promising than
the statistical for detecting new or IDS-cloaked attacks.  However the
notion of "conforming to RFCs" leaves a lot of leeway for the vendors
to play with.  How well do these types of systems actually work?

Does anyone have any recommendations as to which systems to look
into/stay away from?  Below is a list of some of the ones that looked
like they might support protocol anomaly detection from their
marketing hype, let me know if I left any out/incorrectly added any:

Lancope Stealthwatch
Tipping Point/UnityOne
ISS RealSecure Guard
Cisco IDS 4250
CA/eTrust IDS
Intruvert Intrushield
NFR Network Intrusion Detection System
Netscreen/Onesecure IDP
Symantec ManHunt

Any clues or headstarts to get me pointed in the right direction would
be great.

Thanks
-Mike


- --
Martin Roesch - Founder/CTO Sourcefire Inc. - (410) 290-1616
Sourcefire: Enterprise-class Intrusion detection built on Snort
roesch () sourcefire com - http://www.sourcefire.com
Snort: Open Source Network IDS - http://www.snort.org

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- -- Martin Roesch - Founder/CTO Sourcefire Inc. - (410) 290-1616
Sourcefire: Enterprise-class Intrusion detection built on Snort
roesch () sourcefire com - http://www.sourcefire.com
Snort: Open Source Network IDS - http://www.snort.org

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