IDS mailing list archives
Re: Active response... some thoughts.
From: "Ali Saifullah Khan" <ali_saifullah () hotmail com>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2003 00:18:15 +0500
Todd's question still remains. I'm sure you tried to clear it out, but does a "TCP" RST have any effect on "UDP"-oriented connections ? We're dealing with 2 different protocols here. The protocol behind the RST packet being TCP raises the previous question, and that's what we're trying to figure out here. ----- Original Message ----- From: mb_lima <mb_lima () uol com br> To: <b_paul_palmer () yahoo com> Cc: <focus-ids () securityfocus com> Sent: Friday, January 31, 2003 9:34 PM Subject: Re: Active response... some thoughts.
Hi Paul, It is perfect your explanation, but an attacker can create ways to keep a sensor busy enough so that "if the sensor is fast enough" is not true. But I agree with you. TCP RST works fine for me. Best Regards, MarceloActually, TCP RST is more than just a marketing solution. In practice, if the sensor is fast enough, a TCP RST can and often will prevent even single packet attacks. Here is why... A TCP RST does not cause orderly connection termination. It causes immediate connection termination. That is, the protocol stack is not required to deliver pending data and typically does not. If you also take into consideration that on most operating systems, applications are not dispatched immediately upon arrival of new data, there is a window of opportunity for the protocol stack to receive and process the RST even before the application can read the previously received data from the single packet attack! On most operating systems, when a process is moved from a wait queue to the run queue, it is not given immediate control of the CPU unless it has a "realtime" priority or the run queue is completely empty. Therefore, it will on average have to wait half a time slice before it can read its data. A typical time slice is 10ms. If the IDS can get the RST sent in under 5ms, it can often stop a single packet attack. The odds go up if the IDS is faster or the server is busy.On Tuesday, January 28, 2003, at 08:31 AM, Garbrecht,Frederick wrote:ummmm, just a technical quibble, but a TCP resetwouldn't work with theSapphire worm because it propagates using UDP astransport, notTCP.....It is just a minor quibble because the point is thatthe attack wascompletely contained in a single packet. The samewould have held trueif it was over a TCP/IP connection. Once the attackhas beencompleted, a TCP RST would provide no value. It isthe proverbialclosing the barn doors after the horse is alreadyout.RST is largely a marketing solution, not a technicalsolution.Todd__________________________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail Plus - Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now. http://mailplus.yahoo.com--- UOL, o melhor da Internet http://www.uol.com.br/
Current thread:
- RE: Active response... some thoughts. Brian Laing (Feb 03)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: Active response... some thoughts. Chris Travers (Feb 03)
- Re: Active response... some thoughts. Scott Wimer (Feb 05)
- Re: Active response... some thoughts. Thomas H. Ptacek (Feb 05)
- Re: Active response... some thoughts. Chris Travers (Feb 05)
- RE: Active response... some thoughts. Pete Herzog (Feb 06)
- RE: Active response... some thoughts. Gonzalez, Albert (Feb 05)
- RE: Active response... some thoughts. Rob McMillen (Feb 06)
- Re: Active response... some thoughts. Ali Saifullah Khan (Feb 05)
- RE: Active response... some thoughts. Abe L. Getchell (Feb 06)
- Re: Active response... some thoughts. fr0ck9 (Feb 05)
- RE: Active response... some thoughts. Rob Shein (Feb 07)
- RE: Active response... some thoughts. Ralph Los (Feb 07)
- Re: Active response... some thoughts. SecurityFocus (Feb 10)
- RE: Active response... some thoughts. Ralph Los (Feb 07)
- Re: Active response... some thoughts. andre (Feb 08)
- Re: Active response... some thoughts. Frank Knobbe (Feb 10)
- RE: Active response... some thoughts. Rob Shein (Feb 11)
- Re: Active response... some thoughts. andre (Feb 08)