Firewall Wizards mailing list archives

RE: Vulnerability Response (was: BGP TCP RST Attacks)


From: "Paul D. Robertson" <paul () compuwar net>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 2004 15:27:16 -0400 (EDT)

On Fri, 4 Jun 2004, Ben Nagy wrote:

Current vulnerability research is finding lots of lots of amusing ways to
make software fail in spite of "Secure Development Practices".

Yes, but that's mostly immaterial the the point- which was inserting the
security function into the product evaluation phase by making vendors do
the security dance, letting the users see that despite the marketing
glossies, the vendors have No Clue[tm] of what's really in their products
unless they're doing things well- if they are, then they're likely to have
reduced more risk than their competitors.

The thing is that even good methodology can create bugs that are nearly
impossible to find with manual or automatic code auditing tools - as long as

Yes, but bad methodology creates more bugs- so it's still a general win.

Rather than measuring on (known) bugs/kloc I think it would be better to ask
"What is your approach to fault test your own object code?", "How do you
plan for component failure" and that kind of thing. Vendors that don't test
their code using the same methods as attackers will get 0wned. This is why

Vendors don't need to be attackers, they just have to know how to code
well, and know what attacks exist, and how to not have them.  Like all
things, it's relative, but just like inspecting a configuration versus
scanning a system- when you have the source, you get more accuracy from
looking at it[0] than from trying it[1].

[0] Assuming you know what you're looking at.
[1] Assuming no environmental issues.

Paul
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paul D. Robertson      "My statements in this message are personal opinions
paul () compuwar net       which may have no basis whatsoever in fact."
probertson () trusecure com Director of Risk Assessment TruSecure Corporation
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