Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives
Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights
From: Ronald King <ronald.king () MORGAN EDU>
Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2018 13:05:55 -0400
We restrict admin access to IT support personnel with IT support in their job for those that want admin on administrative systems, such as those in HR, Admissions, Bursar, etc. We use a form for all admin request. For academic systems, such as in labs, we aren't as strict. The big reason we were successful was resolving a state audit finding from 5 years ago. We essentially ripped the band aid off and took some lumps from our customers. We use SCCM for app distribution and are looking at options to grant temp access via tools like Make Me Admin. Ron *Ronald A. King, CISSP* Chief Information Security Officer Morgan State University Office: (443) 885-3372 1700 E. Cold Spring Ln. Email: ronald.king () morgan edu Baltimore, MD 21251 URL: http://www.morgan.edu *Growing the future ... Leading the world* <http://www.morgan.edu/Documents/ABOUT/StrategicPlan/StrategicPlan2011-21_Final.pdf> On Tue, Aug 14, 2018 at 12:09 PM, Alex Lindstrom <aglind () udel edu> wrote:
At the University of Delaware, we're increasing deployment of desktop management solutions that include admin account management alongside other controls like domain joining, app whitelisting, automated patching, and anti-virus. We pitch this as a value-add for the end users and their units because the management service automates many of the basic, essential security tasks they'd otherwise have to handle manually. The end result is that these tasks become transparent to end users: employees can continue about their business with minimal disruption (and that counts disruption from managing security settings as well as from incidents resulting from insufficient security). They just log in to their computers with their institutional credentials and they're good to go. If they notice anything unusual, we're just a phone call or an email away. The discussion isn't about trust vs lack thereof, it's about making lives easier *and* enhancing security while we're at it. Exceptions can be made for those users who have a need to retain admin account access, but it's not typically necessary. When an exception is made, the user gets a separate admin account on that machine for escalation when necessary, but they retain their normal user account for routine use. Our client support teams also receive and image new computers before they go out to end users; the employee receives a machine that's already set up with the essential business and security software. ----- Alex Lindstrom IT Security Analyst II UD IT Security (302) 831-4823 https://www.udel.edu/security/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www1.udel.edu_security_&d=DwMFaQ&c=0CCt47_3RbNABITTvFzZbA&r=hF9utfnfkGfY793x81M4Gr0nwxs9KYTZ6TUPUh4wPjs&m=TxNV2yzoVLbEWeVqvb7DRTyqQhGCvEMXWuFs5XLcrxg&s=JJYsibktb8Dsn8llaYtkUuEIPRR6UpVR68Qix3M5rco&e=> On Tue, Aug 14, 2018 at 11:43 AM, Gregg, Christopher S. < csgregg () stthomas edu> wrote:Our admin access plan is very similar. We flipped our default to no admin access and require a business reason for the access. We have admittedly been somewhat lenient in accepting the reason, but we decided it is more important to get everyone into a consistent model. Before the new policy, admin access was all over the board… some local machine accounts, some domain accounts, some shared accounts, etc. Even with a more lenient approach we have significantly reduced the number of users with admin access to the university managed machines, and those who do are using a centrally managed account. We use LAPS as an in between step for those needing short term admin access, we use the software center to allow people to install approved software, and our support staff are able to use remote tools. All of these reduce the need for admin access. We received some push back when we rolled out the new policy two years ago, but overall it has gone smoothly. Thanks, Chris *Chris Gregg* Associate Vice President of Information Security & Risk Management, CISO Information Technology Services (ITS) csgregg () stthomas edu p 1 (651) 962-6265 *University of St. Thomas* | stthomas.edu <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.stthomas.edu&d=DwMFaQ&c=0CCt47_3RbNABITTvFzZbA&r=hF9utfnfkGfY793x81M4Gr0nwxs9KYTZ6TUPUh4wPjs&m=TxNV2yzoVLbEWeVqvb7DRTyqQhGCvEMXWuFs5XLcrxg&s=NQbCs9Y52FCH7WvBlsQH7qtKJFwP0Lc2XEXrgSukk2k&e=> *From:* The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv < SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU> *On Behalf Of *Kevin Ledbetter *Sent:* Monday, August 13, 2018 10:58 AM *To:* SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU *Subject:* Re: [SECURITY] Restricting PC Admin Rights We have removed local admin privileges for most of our Non-IT users accounts. Where the department has specified a legitimate business need for local admin rights, we have created a secondary admin account for specific users. We use the naming convention username.admin. The only time the user uses this account is to provide local admin credentials when prompted by Windows. when they are installing/updating software. Kevin On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 10:40 AM, Jack Barrett < jwbarrett () massasoit mass edu> wrote: We restrict admin rights. We allow admin rights if they sign a “Admin Access Request” form. This needs to be signed by the employee’s supervisor and approved by IT Jack Barrett Deputy CIO Massasoit Community College 508-588-9100 Ext 1146 *Beware of “phishing” attempts for your username, and password, Massasoit Community College will NEVER ask for your username and password in an email. * *Think before you click!* *From:* The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv < SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU> *On Behalf Of *McHugh, Susan *Sent:* Monday, August 13, 2018 11:09 AM *To:* SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU *Subject:* Re: [SECURITY] Restricting PC Admin Rights We restrict admin rights. We had the backing of the EVP when an instructor downloaded the wrong software. Employees were upset when they lost their ability to change their desktop. ____________________ Susan McHugh Chief Information Officer Mount Wachusett Community College s_mchugh () mwcc mass edu 978-630-9174 *From:* The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv < SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU> *On Behalf Of *Andrew Chiarello *Sent:* Monday, August 13, 2018 11:08 AM *To:* SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU *Subject:* Re: [SECURITY] Restricting PC Admin Rights We do not restrict admin rights (and all proposals to do so have been squelched before getting very far). Andrew J. Chiarello Lead Engineer, Infrastructure & Systems Bryn Mawr College achiarello () brynmawr edu (610) 526-7966 ------------------------------ *From:* The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv < SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU> on behalf of Pardonek, Jim < jpardonek () LUC EDU> *Sent:* Monday, August 13, 2018 11:06:29 AM *To:* SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU *Subject:* [SECURITY] Restricting PC Admin Rights Not sure if there is somewhere else I can get this info, I’m sure it’s been asked before, but I am checking to see how many of your institutions restrict admin rights. We are putting a proposal together to leadership to do exactly that as we have had a number of folks fall for scams that involve the installation of software on their PCs. Thanks, *James Pardonek, MS, CISSP, CEH, GSNA* *Information Security Officer* * Loyola University Chicago 1032 W. 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Current thread:
- Restricting PC Admin Rights Pardonek, Jim (Aug 13)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Andrew Chiarello (Aug 13)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Barton, Robert W. (Aug 13)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Andrew Chiarello (Aug 13)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Gregory Keane (Aug 13)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Barton, Robert W. (Aug 13)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights McHugh, Susan (Aug 13)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Jack Barrett (Aug 13)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Kevin Ledbetter (Aug 13)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Gregg, Christopher S. (Aug 14)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Alex Lindstrom (Aug 14)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Ronald King (Aug 20)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Andrew Chiarello (Aug 13)
- Re: [External Sender] [SECURITY] Restricting PC Admin Rights Frank Barton (Aug 13)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Boyd, Daniel (Aug 13)
- Message not available
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Richard Gould (Aug 13)
- Re: Restricting PC Admin Rights Frank Barton (Aug 13)
- Message not available