Re: Are users right in rejecting security advice?

[Michael Sinatra <michael () RANCID BERKELEY EDU>]

On 3/17/10 11:51 AM, Eric Case wrote:
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv
> > [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Michael Sinatra
> > Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2010 11:25 AM
> > To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
> > Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Are users right in rejecting security advice?
> >
> >
> > I agree completely that it's more useful to communicate risks than to
> > have rigid policies.  That allows the users to put in compensating
> > controls that fit their needs.
>
> Is it then ok if the user accepts more risk than the institution is willing
> to accept?

Your question doesn't actually relate to my quote above, which referred
to the risks that the institution recognizes to itself.  Your question
IS relevant to my second paragraph (not quoted by you) where I discuss
"monetizing" user-generated externalities and trying to capture them in
the market.  Here is the answer:

If the externality is captured, yes.  That's the whole point.  Extra
risk can be managed if the institution understands the economic
incentives and can properly modify them.

Here's an example: The central IT organization provides database
services for campus users.  They know they need to take extra care if
users have trigger-notifying data on the system.  They could enforce a
policy whereby users are not allowed to have TND (which might actually
cause some users to work around the policy), or they could provide a fee
schedule whereby the costs of TND storage are paid by the entities that
derive the benefit, while creating incentives to minimize TND.  Heck,
you could even have a cap-and-trade system if it doesn't get too
complicated.

Mind you, I am not a free-market fundamentalist and I recognize that
there are limitations to this approach.  But I also recognize that such
economic incentives cannot be ignored and they cannot *effectively* be
overcome merely by fete of policy.  I see way too much of that it higher
ed security right now.

michael