Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives
Re: Password Complexity and Aging
From: "Lucas, Bryan" <b.lucas () TCU EDU>
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2009 19:19:24 -0500
Kevin, Thanks for forwarding this story and the SANS "20" link, very helpful. Bryan Lucas Executive Director Technology Resources (817) 257-7682 From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Mclaughlin, Kevin (mclaugkl) Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 6:16 PM To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Password Complexity and Aging Facts are usually a good thing: ================================================= TOP OF THE NEWS --US Power Grid Infiltrated (April 8 & 9, 2009) US national security officials said that the computer networks of the country's electrical grid and other utilities have been infiltrated and seeded with tools that could potentially be used to disrupt communications, electricity, and other elements of the country's critical infrastructure. As yet, there have been no attempts made to use the software to cause damage. Most of the intrusions were not detected by the companies responsible for the systems, but by US intelligence. In light of this report, cyber security experts have begun urging the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Department to push for legislation that would grant them more oversight and authority to manage grid (cyber) security. Earlier this week, before reports of the intrusions, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) recommended that energy companies look closely at how they identify critical assets and critical cyber assets. ==========================================================
From SANs - maybe you heard of them.
-Kevin Kevin L. McLaughlin, CISM, CISSP, GIAC-GSLC, PMP, ITIL Master Certified Assistant Vice President, Information Security & Special Projects University of Cincinnati 513-556-9177 ________________________________ From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv [SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Perloff, Jim [perloffj () UCHASTINGS EDU] Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 6:35 PM To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Password Complexity and Aging Wow! Most of America's electrical utilities have been hacked! Assistant VP McLaughlin should report that fact to Homeland Security and Congress because last week it was only reported that some systems had problems. No doubt Homeland Security will be unhappy to learn it underestimated the severity of the problem - it wasn't a few systems but "most of their [electric companies'] systems". I'm sure however they'll also be happy to learn the attack vector was brute force password attacks. This will save them some time in forensics. Jim Perloff Network Administrator UC Hastings College of the Law 200 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102 415.565.4712 http://uchastings.edu/infotech/index.html From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Mclaughlin, Kevin (mclaugkl) Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 3:15 PM To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Password Complexity and Aging The reason is to minimize the effectiveness of Brute Force Attacks. Maybe if our electric companies had seen the value they wouldn't have had foriegn agents install root-kits across most of their systems. Respectfully, -Kevin Kevin L. McLaughlin, CISM, CISSP, GIAC-GSLC, PMP, ITIL Master Certified Assistant Vice President, Information Security & Special Projects University of Cincinnati 513-556-9177 ________________________________ From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv [SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Karl Heins [Karl.Heins () OIST UCSB EDU] Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 5:13 PM To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Password Complexity and Aging Several years ago our external auditors (PWC) made a recommendation to change the password aging from 90 to 60 days at one campus and also made a recommendation to change the password aging from 60 to 30 days at another campus. The CIO asked me what would be the basis for either the 30 or 60 days. This started my interest in this topic. With over 20 years of IT audit experience, including 10 years at a large CPA firm (3 years in the national office), and after spending some time on the topic, I was unable to identify a good basis for either the 30, 60 or any number of days. So, working with the System wide UC CIO, we looked into our experiences with the password aging. With hundreds of systems and many problems with our combined experience, we were not able to find a single actual case where just aging out a password would have made a difference. I also challenged our auditors PWC to show a basis for their recommendations, no factual cases where there would have been a change in results. As a result I see little value in changing passwords just because of the passage of time. Aging passwords seems like good idea, however there appears little factual evidence supporting this effort. While my work was antidotal and lacks the rigor of good research, it would help if I could point to a single factual case where not aging passwords would have prevented a problem. To date, I have no such case. Don't feel that I am soft on controls or passwords, I consider other password controls critical to a good internal control system. I can point to plenty of cases where sharing passwords caused a problem. Problems that cost the organization real dollars of loss. I also feel that strong passwords are important, I feel that passwords should be hashed (not saved in the clear), and that anytime a password compromised it should be changed. Password be a good, effective, inexpensive control if handled properly. I realize that the password changing process is a part of every auditor, regulator and security person's standard checklist. I am not oppose to changing passwords periodically, I just see very little value in changing because the passage of time. An I continue to look for that first case where aging would have made a difference. Respectfully and with an open mind Karl ------------------------ Karl Heins Chief Information Security Officer University of California, Santa Barbara Karl.Heins () oist ucsb edu (805) 893-8843
Current thread:
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging, (continued)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Doty, Timothy T. (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Karl Heins (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Basgen, Brian (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Gary Dobbins (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Mclaughlin, Kevin (mclaugkl) (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Mclaughlin, Kevin (mclaugkl) (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Perloff, Jim (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Basgen, Brian (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Mclaughlin, Kevin (mclaugkl) (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Mclaughlin, Kevin (mclaugkl) (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Lucas, Bryan (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging David L. Wasley (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging David L. Wasley (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Mclaughlin, Kevin (mclaugkl) (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Russell Fulton (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Morrow Long (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Basgen, Brian (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Mike Waller (Apr 13)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Chad McDonald (Apr 14)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Doug Markiewicz (Apr 14)
- Re: Password Complexity and Aging Dexter Caldwell (Apr 14)
(Thread continues...)