Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives
Re: Laptop encryption
From: "O'Callaghan, Daniel" <Daniel.OCallaghan () SINCLAIR EDU>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2007 10:33:12 -0400
1. What is your current practice:
We looked at laptop encryption about 2 years ago and decided the resource hit, risk of data loss, key management, and user-related issues were significant enough that we could not support 'mandating' across the board. We opted for mandating the use of drive locking technology (HP DriveLock) for all College-owned administrative (ie faculty & staff) laptops. DriveLock essentially uses the TPM chip which prevents the drive from booting/initializing until the password is entered, even if the drive is removed & inserted in another device, it will not boot. College policy requires all laptop purchases be coordinated with and processed by IT. When the machine arrives on campus, IT sets the 'master' DriveLock password and the owner sets the user password on delivery. We initially met user resistance to this 'extra' password requirement, but have overcome a lot of it by also allowing users to implement the stored credentials (essentially a password vault) feature offered by the machines. A caveat is that users must be taught to power-down, not just hibernate, the laptop when traveling as DriveLock only works at powerup.
2. What is your desired practice if you do not use encryption on
laptops Our Acceptable Use Policy does state that all personal identifying information stored on local devices, portable devices, or removable media must be encrypted or redacted. We offer user training on using WinZip, AxCrypt, and Truecrypt for encryption of individual files or folders. We do realize that this DriveLock is essentially technology enhanced "security by obscurity" and is not a perfect solution, but think it is a pretty good solution based on risk/usability. Our legal counsel opines that if a user (who doesn't follow the AUP encryption requirement) loses a laptop containing personal information, DriveLock "might" provide a defense under the "data elements unreadable" definition of Ohio's data breach notification law...but we are really hoping we do not have the opportunity to find out. ________________________________________________ Daniel V. O'Callaghan, Jr., MBA, CISSP Chief Information Security Officer Sinclair Community College 444 West Third Street, 14-324 Dayton, Ohio 45402-1460 937-512-2452 Fax 937-512-3124 daniel.ocallaghan () sinclair edu
Current thread:
- Laptop encryption Dennis Tracz (Oct 04)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: Laptop encryption Greg Vickers (Oct 04)
- Re: Laptop encryption Gary Flynn (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption Harold Winshel (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption Matthew Gracie (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption O'Callaghan, Daniel (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption David Taylor (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption David Seidl (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption Gary Flynn (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption Jim Dillon (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption David Taylor (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption Sarah Stevens (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption Paul Keser (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption Curt Wilson (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption Dennis Tracz (Oct 05)
- Re: Laptop encryption Dennis Tracz (Oct 05)
(Thread continues...)