Security Basics mailing list archives

RE: Basic Network Configuration


From: "David Gillett" <gillettdavid () fhda edu>
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2003 11:41:00 -0700

-----Original Message-----
From: Ansgar -59cobalt- Wiechers [mailto:bugtraq () planetcobalt net]
Sent: October 16, 2003 03:25
To: security-basics () securityfocus com
Subject: Re: Basic Network Configuration


On 2003-10-15 David Gillett wrote:
One implements a DMZ in order to impose three sets of
firewall rules:
  - between the internet and the DMZ subnet
  - between the internet and the trusted subnet
  - between the DMZ subnet and the trusted subnet

IMHO the second rule is void, since no traffic should bypass the DMZ.

a)  WHY???  So a compromised DMZ host can sniff it?

b)  Voiding the second rule means totally trusting all traffic
that originates from your internal network.  In 1993, you could
usually get away with that.  In 2003, you CAN'T.  You MUST
filter that traffic; whether you do it in one place or two, you
still have that second rule.
 
If, instead, you use two boxes, your traffic between the 
internet and
the trusted subnet incurs an extra router hop in each 
direction.  Not
a big deal, but performance purists tend to complain about firewall
overheads already.
Two firewalls will not necessarily cost more than one, if 
you can get
away with SOHO models that only have two interfaces instead of
industrial-strength boxes which typically support three or more.

I have to disagree on this. Two firewalls *will* cost more than one
because you will have to maintain (confguration, patches, ...) two
different systems. There is no point in implementing the same firewall
twice (with different rulesets) because in that case both systems will
most likely be vulnerable to the same exploits.

  You're not disagreeing AT ALL, unless you consider deployment of 
cheap SOHO firewall appliances acceptable for a site that hosts services
in a DMZ.  You don't, do you?
 
The usual justification for using two firewalls is that an attacker
would have to get past both to get into the trusted 
network.  You only
really achieve this benefit if the boxes run different OS 
and firewall
code, so that no single vulnerability works against both.

Of course. Anything else is completely pointless.

But if you use two boxes, then your rules that govern 
traffic between
the internet and the trusted subnet may appear on either box -- are,
in fact, the intersection of rules found on both boxes.

I don't see many reasons why traffic should bypass the DMZ - provided
you are already going to the trouble of implementing a 2-device setup.
OTOH I may be missing something here.

  Read twice, answer once.  In the two-box case, internal<->internet
traffic DOESN'T bypass the DMZ.  I consider that a problem, you don't.
  But my point here is that in the two-box case, that traffic has to 
cross both boxes -- and gets filtered by rules on BOTH boxes.  This
isn't just inefficient, it's also hard to manage.
 
Correctly managing such a split ruleset can be a challenge, even if
both boxes use the same syntax and user interface -- which 
they won't,
if they're distinct enough to cover against firewall 
vulnerabilities!

True. That's the price you have to pay.

Regards
Ansgar Wiechers

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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FREE Whitepaper: Better Management for Network Security

Looking for a better way to manage your IP security?
Learn how Solsoft can help you:
- Ensure robust IP security through policy-based management
- Make firewall, VPN, and NAT rules interoperable across heterogeneous
networks
- Quickly respond to network events from a central console

Download our FREE whitepaper at:
http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/Solsoft_security-basics_031015
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