nanog mailing list archives

Re: Starting to Drop Invalids for Customers


From: Matt Corallo <nanog () as397444 net>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 11:35:20 -0500

Right, but you’re also taking a strong, cryptographically-authenticated system and making it sign non-authenticated 
data. Please don’t do that. If you want to add the data to RPKI, there should be a way to add the data to RPKI, not 
sign away control of your number resources to unauthenticated sources.

On Dec 11, 2019, at 10:17, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists () gmail com> wrote:

On Wed, Dec 11, 2019 at 5:52 AM Rubens Kuhl <rubensk () gmail com> wrote:



Which brings me to my favorite possible RPKI-IRR integration: a ROA that says that IRR objects on IRR source x 
with maintainer Y are authoritative for a given number resource. Kinda like SPF for BGP.


Is this required? or a crutch for use until a network can publish all
of their routing data in the RPKI?


It provides an adoption path based on the information already published in IRRs by operators for some years. It also 
covers for the fact that RPKI currently is only origin-validation.

I would think that if you(royal you) already are publishing:
 "these are the routes i'm going to originate (and here are my customer lists)"

and you (royal you) are accepting the effort to publish 1 'new' thing
in the RPKI.

you could just as easily take the 'stuff I'm going to publish in IRR'
and 'also publish in RPKI'.
Right? So adoption path aside, because that seems like a weird
argument (since your automation to make IRR data appear can ALSO just
send rpki updates), your belief is that: "Hey, this irr object is
really, really me" is still useful/required/necessary/interesting?

-chris


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