Re: Hijacked Network Ranges

[Mark Tinka <mtinka () globaltransit net>]

On Monday, February 06, 2012 03:06:24 PM Christopher Morrow 
wrote:

> do you have customers with 10k long prefix lists? it gets
> hard when the lists get long, or the data is for
> downstream folks of your customer. Good that someone's
> checking though, I'd love to see this part automated.

No, we don't have customers with 10,000-long prefix lists, 
but we have planned to implement automation (either using 
the IRR Toolset or home-grown solutions) to make this 
possible as a means to scaling, should that time arise.

As it is now, throwing NOC staff at the problem for the 
volumes we have works well enough. But this is, by no means, 
a panacea as we scale up.

Heck, one must even worry whether a some router 
configurations can take that many lines. But there are other 
ways around that.

> RPKI doesn't necessarily mean that the router knows
> anything about certificates in the short-term. I think
> there's a time when 'the resource certification system'
> (which is really, today, the rpki) holds cert/roa data
> that you could use to filter what the IRR tells you for
> a customer. You could even do this in any automated
> manner!

Well, given validation information will be available within 
a network, one may use it in non-obvious ways to implement 
policy.

> The time between the previous and next paragraphs though
> is when all isp's will need to beat the drums with their
> customers saying: "Hey, you REALLY need to get that shit
> into the 'resource certification system' (rpki), NOW."
> (because shortly we'll stop accepting your "invalid"
> routes... and then the interwebs won't be able to find
> you, and we'll all be sad.)

Well, we have all seen how doing this with DNSSEC, IPv6 and 
4-byte ASN's worked out.

We need to understand that different operators and different 
customers will have varying reasons as to why they can't yet 
"do the right thing". There is abundant evidence of this 
with other similar initiatives.

Adoption will have to be incremental. During that time, the 
Internet must not break.

> sure... it's not working so well though :(

Not for lack of having some kind of solution.

What we have today may not be the best, most scalable 
option, but it is one nonetheless. Automating it (like what 
RPSL does) is how you can make it scale to some extent, but 
it's still the same solution.

We can't just sit around waiting for RPKI. There will be 
some reason why some of us can't deploy it, while someone 
else is thinking up its successor. Rinse, repeat.

Mark.

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