RE: CodeGreen beta release (idq-patcher/antiCodeRed/etc.)

["John R. Morris" <jrmorris () lycurgus nerdality com>]

Actually, this is similiar to what my company does for the various dept.'s.
IF you violate a rule, you are e-mailed about it, and then blocked off. You
call them, they say, "ahhhh -- it's because we don't allow xyz over public
connections..." and so forth. Works great.

- John


-----Original Message-----
From: Stanley G. Bubrouski [mailto:stan () ccs neu edu]
Sent: Thursday, September 06, 2001 5:33 PM
To: Emre Yildirim
Cc: Kev; vuln-dev () securityfocus com
Subject: Re: CodeGreen beta release (idq-patcher/antiCodeRed/etc.)


On Thu, 6 Sep 2001, Emre Yildirim wrote:

> Kev wrote:
>
>
> > Unfortunately, all the world's not the USA (much to the chagrin of many
> > of my fellow citizens, it seems).  Also, there are many, many, many
> > clueless admins out there; anybody that has to deal with script kiddies
> > knows just how often Korean (for instance) hosts are broken into and
used
> > for all sorts of nefarious purposes.  90% of the time, I'm unable to
even
> > report spam to the open relays in that country, because not only is
> > postmaster@ not even present, the contacts listed in whois.nic.or.kr
just
> > point into never-never land.  I fear we will never see the end of this
> > particular problem :/
>
> I know what you mean.  I had to deal with lots of attacks & probes from
> *ac.kr myself.  I think a long time ago there was a discussion on
> incidents@ (I think, I'm not sure) suggesting to create router ACL's
> with korean/offending IP numbers to block them completely from the
> Internet (similar to e-mail anti-spam lists).  But then again, that
> defeats the purpose of the internet (to communicate around the world).
> As long as admins aren't educated and made aware of these problems, it's
> not going to change at all.  But I'm not completely sure if infecting
> systems with a counter-worm is the solution either.  Like some people
> already pointed out, it does consume lots of bandwidth, sets off IDSs,
> and irritates people who have Apache servers, whose logs get clogged up
> by these obsolete requests.  Code Red is going to die out sometime
> eventually, just like Melissa did...so I'm not worried about it much.

It may sound unreasonable but using access-lists on routers on routers is
great way for companies and providers to stop the spread of Code Red.  By
blockign all traffic from a person's machine they are then forced to call
their provider's tech support to report they lost their connection.  The
provider then can inform the customer they are infected, explain to them
they must patch their system, remove them from the ACLs, wait 24 hours and
if they show signs they are patched then do not reapply the ACL.  Anotehr
way is to turn on router and firewall logging and use ACLs to log http
traffic and filter out Code Red infected users and call them and e-mail
them the patches.  This doesn't block the user from accessing the network
like the first method does, but it also doesn't prevent the infected user
from infecting more people on the net and congesting the network.

Regards,

Stan

--
Stan Bubrouski                                       stan () ccs neu edu
23 Westmoreland Road, Hingham, MA 02043        Cell:   (617) 835-3284




> Cheers
>
> --
> Emre Yildirim <emre () asper org>
> GPG KeyID 0xF9E4A1D1 (keyserver.pgp.com)