Vulnerability Development mailing list archives
Re: distributed.net and seti@home
From: kgouws () GLOBAL CO ZA (Kerneels)
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2000 23:04:57 +0200
This may sound silly, but for all you know your machine could be churning away at decrypting the FBI login passwords for all you know, or whetever else, with a lovely gui showing you that you still havent found any aliens :) If there is no source, how can you be sure what is being deciphered? I personally like the idea of everyone working together toward a common goal, but I dont believe in blind trust. just my opinion. Kerneels Gouws. Sen_Ml Sen_Ml wrote:
i'm getting a number of private comments about my posting, but rather than reply individually, here are my thoughts. one person mentioned that seti does not communicate w/ headquarters until it's finished with making its packet. i fail to see the relevance of this. how do i know what's in the packet? i could scan all packets leaving the network to see...what exactly? how do i know that info about my network isn't being leaked? for me at least, it isn't worth the effort to try to figure out what info is being sent -- there might be a design spec for the packets sent back about computational results, but how do i know whether the spec is followed or that there is no way to encode info about my network in there (everyone knows about steganogrpahy right?)? i can't expect the world at large to go over source code that isn't available. much better to not run and not allow that sort of software to run on my network to begin with. which is in fact what i do -- of course, you still have to look for people running the software ;-P even if you are monitoring your network for certain packets and you know whose machine is running some distributed client, you still have to take the time to go deal with it. it might also involve confrontations w/ people that you might have been able to avoid otherwise. but i digress. don't get me wrong, i think the distributed approach to some of these problems is a great idea. i just think that given how many different places this kind of code runs, source really ought to be available and/or people should really think about where they run this kind of code (and indeed, i'm sure people do think about this -- just not enough people -- the awareness problem). wait, the same idea applies to operating systems -- ah, now i see why i don't run certain ones ;-) it's not like i doubt the authors' intentions -- i distrust people who might want to abuse the fact that the code is so widespread. it's also not like the folks who write the code always get to decide what to put in -- also if people are under nda, they may not be allowed to talk about what they put in either. i am not suggesting here that i believe that for any of these projects there is anything sinister going on. but who knows whether it might happen in the future in of these projects and it might happen in some new project that does collect info in a similar manner. i'm reminded of a certain maker of audio software and personal information... i agree that if software like this were to put network interfaces into promiscuous mode that people would (i hope) notice. obviously, that's not the only way to gain useful info about a network -- i used the word 'sniffing' originally, but perhaps i should have used more general phrasing. depending of the system you have, you could watch system calls, registry accesses, etc. to guess at what kind of info a piece of software uses or collects, but w/ the source you can stop guessing. why spend all that extra effort? another point to consider is the fact that it might be possible to write software that puts a network interface into promiscous mode w/o being able to tell in the usual ways by modifying the existing system. it's not like this hasn't been done for un*x boxen before -- i wouldn't be surprised if this could be pulled off for windows boxen either (perhaps it already has been). even in this case i would hope someone would notice, but it's surprising how long this can take sometimes. i suppose it ends up being the full-disclosure discussion. there is one point that i haven't heard discussed though which has to do w/ people getting used to features or the way certain systems behave. it's true that in specific cases you may be able to decide not to run certain software -- through policy, enforecement, etc. however, if enough of the right (or wrong?) people get used to some idea -- like running some of these distributed clients -- they may start building similar systems using similar designs (e.g. distributed w/ no source code). after a while, people may just come to expect certain kinds of systems. once enough of the population thinks this way it may become very hard for you to decide not to use certain types of systems. some of the long-term potential consequences don't feel very good.
Current thread:
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home, (continued)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Stefan Aeschbacher (Feb 01)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Robert Wojciechowski Jr. (Jan 31)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Sebastian (Jan 31)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Clifford, Shawn A (Jan 31)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Seth R Arnold (Jan 31)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home CyberPsychotic (Jan 31)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Oliver Friedrichs (Feb 01)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Iván Arce (Feb 02)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Oliver Friedrichs (Feb 01)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Sen_Ml Sen_Ml (Feb 01)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Kerneels (Feb 02)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Granquist, Lamont (Feb 03)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Steffen Zahn (Feb 04)
- Re: distributed.net and seti@home Sen_Ml Sen_Ml (Feb 01)
- Possible DHCP DOS attack Paul Keefer (Feb 02)
- Re: Possible DHCP DOS attack Sebastian Andersson (Feb 02)
- Re: Possible DHCP DOS attack Eric Hacker (Feb 03)
- Re: Possible DHCP DOS attack C.J. Oster (Feb 03)
- Re: Possible DHCP DOS attack Erik Fichtner (Feb 03)
- Re: Possible DHCP DOS attack Matthew S. Hallacy (Feb 03)
- DHCP and Security Nitzenberger, Rob, MSgt, AF/XORR (Feb 03)
- Re: DHCP and Security Erik Fichtner (Feb 03)