Secure Coding mailing list archives

Software process improvement produces secure software?


From: James.McGovern at thehartford.com (McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT))
Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2007 10:58:37 -0400

One thing that I am firm in my belief is that process is not a substitute for competence. Imagine taking lots of 
overweight IT guys and training them to ride a horse. That doesn't mean that they will go on to become successful horse 
jockeys and you would be dumb to bet on them.
 
In terms of CMMi, my thought says that buyers of consulting services and enterprise software need an independent way of 
quantifying what they are buying from a security perspective. While the logic used in outsourcing is flawed, buyers 
still prefer outsourcing firms that have higher levels of CMMI than those that don't. 
 
In the same way this listserv attempts to help folks write secure software, we need a way to help folks also procure 
secure software and stealing some aspects of CMMi while compromising some level of integrity will have lift in the long 
run.

________________________________

From: sc-l-bounces at securecoding.org [mailto:sc-l-bounces at securecoding.org] On Behalf Of Goertzel, Karen
Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2007 9:39 AM
To: sc-l at securecoding.org
Subject: Re: [SC-L] Software process improvement produces secure software?



I've always had a question about this as well; specifically, what is really meant by "adding security to a CMM"?

I've always felt that the level at which the software (or system) process is defined by a CMM is too high and too 
abstract for the addition of security activities to be particularly meaningful.

My feeling is that a CMM is best used as a means of ensuring that the more detailed life cycle process is implemented 
in a disciplined manner, and that the amount of benefit, in terms of improvement of whatever property one is trying to 
improve - quality, reliability, security, safety - of the system/software that results from the process can be measured.

Where the actual security activities need to be defined and added are to the life cycle methodology. At best, adding 
security to a CMM can provide a very high level framework for helping someone who is "shopping" for a life cycle 
methodology know what to look for in that methodology. Is a CMM necessary for that purpose? I'm not convinced that it 
is.

I think what is likely to be more effective is a change in outlook by the practitioners who will be using the life 
cycle methodology. Their outlook needs to change so that a single question is asked before any choice or decision is 
made: What are the security implications of the choice/decision?

Of course, there's much more to it than just asking that question. And that's the reason we need to train developers, 
testers, etc. to (1) understand what "security" means, both at the software and system levels; (2) visualise and 
recognise the possible impact(s) each of their choices/decisions could have on the security of the system they are 
building (before the fact); (3) recognise the impacts each of their choices/decisions has had on the security of the 
system they have built (after the fact). Tools and techniques to help developers do the second and third of these are 
proliferating (e.g., threat modeling, attack trees, etc. for before-the-fact; analysis and testing tools for 
after-the-fact). But in the end, I believe the #1 factor that will contribute to the increased security of software is 
the developer's mentality. A security-aware...and more importantly, a security-*concerned&...developer is more likely 
to (1) avoid making bad choices and decisions, and (2) to take an interest in, and pursue becoming, knowledgeable 
enough to correct bad choices that he/she did not avoid making earlier.

--
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.902.6981
goertzel_karen at bah.com




-----Original Message-----
From: sc-l-bounces at securecoding.org on behalf of Francisco Nunes
Sent: Tue 07-Aug-07 07:01
To: sc-l at securecoding.org
Subject: [SC-L] Software process improvement produces secure software?

Dear list members.

In june 2007, I had an interesting conversation with
Mr. Will Hayes from SEI during the Brazilian Symposium
on Software Quality. It was a great experience and I
am very grateful for this.

During our conversation, I made a question to Mr.
Hayes similar to this: "Is it possible that only
software development process improvements can produce
secure software?"

The scenario was only based on CMMI without security
interference.

His answer to this question was "YES". My answer was
"I DO NOT THINK SO".

His answer made me confuse and I had no arguments,
mainly, because my professional experience in software
process does not compare to Mr. Haye's experience.

Unfortunately, I also haven't found any statistics
which could answer this question. Please, if there is
one, let me know!

So, how about you, list members? What are your answers
to the question above?

I will try to organize your answers and present the
final result.

Thank you.

Yours faithfully,
Francisco Jos? Barreto Nunes.


      Alertas do Yahoo! Mail em seu celular. Saiba mais em http://br.mobile.yahoo.com/mailalertas/
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