Penetration Testing mailing list archives

Re: Using 0days as part of pen-test?


From: ArcSighter Elite <arcsighter () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 16:03:51 -0500

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Jason Ross wrote:

I think a way to report thiis could be via language something like this:

"<tester> observed that <client> was running the <vendor> version
of FTP server daemon. This server has a <type> vulnerability which
allowed <tester> to compromise the integrity of the host. <tester> then
performed the following steps to further compromise the network ..."

My guess is that further details won't be necessary. If for some reason
the client asks for more information, you will need to explain that you
are unable to provide it at this time, as you are currently bound by
a non-disclosure agreement with the vendor of that software to not
release the details of the vulnerability until they have had a chance to
patch it (I'm presuming that this is what you mean when you refer to
'the -intermediary- vendor contact'?).


That will prove to be enough for a report to the client about the issue.
Thanks.

It's probably a good idea to assure them that you will provide full
details as additional documentation once the information is released.
This assurance is likely best done in writing.


Of course I will, once the vuln is public.

Another possibility is that you go back to the vendor of the FTP
software and explain the situation to them. I would hope that any
vendor would be willing to work with one of their customers to fix
a security flaw. Perhaps they will permit you to disclose this
information to their customer (your client); or perhaps they could
work with your client to beta test the patch (if your client was so
inclined).


As I said, I'm neither not in direct contact with the vendor, nor
willing to.

In fact, as I think about this, it's probably a very good idea to do
this, even if you go with the above reporting option. It's extremely
likely that your client will be contacting the FTP vendor to inquire
of them when this vulnerability will be patched, etc.


I know I've braked a lot of phases of any pen-test framework, but IMHO a
blackhat will proceed exactly this way: they'll exploit the network
through its weakest link, and is my task to protect the company from the
blackhat, not from pen-testers (at least not the evil ones).


Personally, I agree, depending on the scope of work.

I don't think there was anything wrong with using your knowledge of
the vulnerability in this test, provided that you have contacted the
vendor of the software and are working with them to get it patched.

The trick, as you've mentioned, is how to report the vulnerability to
the client in an ethical way.

Secondly, the flaw provided me with enough information that otherwise
will take me a lot longer to achieve; so I felt the audit process has
been somehow compromised.

Why do you think this is the case? As long as you've thoroughly audited
the remaining systems, I'm not sure what difference exploiting this FTP
server made other than to make it easier, which is perfectly fine.

I meant to say that the vulnerability and the further network
compromises provided me valuable information that otherwise will take a
lot longer to acquire, that goes from network infrastructure, to
usernames and passwords.

If you left it at "pwnd!" once you exploited the FTP server, and then
slacked off on the remaining testing, I would agree that the audit process
has been compromised. However, you've not indicated such is the case.

--
Jason


Of course i haven't. The audit as I said is far from complete.
Thanks.

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