Penetration Testing mailing list archives
Re: SV: Honeypot detection and countermeasures
From: dave () immunitysec com
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2003 10:44:33 -0400 (EDT)
Well, that's a great way to think about it - as a test of your countermeasures. In fact, there are MANY ways to both remotely and locally detect various breeds of honeypots. VMWare, for example, uses a particular range of MAC addresses, among other things. I always find it funny when people use VMWare as a security measure. But (imho) it's a truly RARE penetration test team that will notice some of these subtle things, and basically no pentration test teams can remotely discover a honeypot - the technology for doing so just isn't public enough yet. (Well, I just gave away that MAC address trick, but it's limited to the local net, and there are lots of other, better tricks). Dave Aitel Immunity, Inc. http://www.immunitysec.com/
But...the last thing, since that was commented (but was removed from the thread I'm answering on). If you hire a company to do a pentest, of course you don't tell them about your countermessaures. The pentest is the exam for the system you have deployed, and the guys that tests you are the examiners. The result from the pentest should/might include that, yes, they found the honeypots, and it distracted them for some time before they understood what they had hit (a honeypot is just another countermeassure), and then the rest of the report comes. If you want to pentest a new service, then of course point them at that service. If you want to pentest your company...then that's what you tell them. Regards, Trygve Aasheim Manager, Network Security -----Opprinnelig melding----- Fra: Rob Shein [mailto:shoten () starpower net] Sendt: 23. juni 2003 15:58 Til: 'Michael Boman'; 'Larry Colen' Kopi: 'Brass, Phil (ISS Atlanta)'; pen-test () securityfocus com Emne: RE: Honeypot detection and countermeasures This wouldn't work. Seeing the packets/traffic on the wire doesn't tell you the tools that are used, and it also doesn't really give you much else. Considering that a honeypot is either not really rootable (DTK) or is very low hanging fruit (and very rootable, like a honeynet.org system), they either won't see tools downloaded to the system or won't see anything more than the bare minimum needed to exploit a system that is too vulnerable to begin with.-----Original Message----- From: Michael Boman [mailto:michael.boman () securecirt com] Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2003 11:32 PM To: Larry Colen Cc: Brass, Phil (ISS Atlanta); pen-test () securityfocus com Subject: Re: Honeypot detection and countermeasures On Wed, 2003-06-18 at 10:15, Larry Colen wrote:Good point. I was more envisioning a scenario where the client was testing the whole security system, including the honeypots. I.e. hiring a pen-tester without giving the pen-tester anyknowldege of thesystem before hand. If I seem like a clueless newbie, I hope that I at leastseem like apolite clueless newbie. I'll crawl back into my hole and lurk a bit more. LarryThere is a viable scenario for this. Let's say ACME Inc. wants to do their own pen-tests because they - Don't like to pay outsiders to do it - Want to compete with the company - They want to steal their tools and techniques - insert your own paranoid explanation for the "why" bit They hire a group of people to hack their systems and record everything so once the exercise is over ACME Inc. now knows the tools and techniques of that particular pen test group. It's unlikely, but possible. Haven't happen to me (yet). Best regards Michael Boman -- Michael Boman Security Architect, SecureCiRT Pte Ltd http://www.securecirt.com
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Current thread:
- Re: Honeypot detection and countermeasures, (continued)
- Re: Honeypot detection and countermeasures Þórhallur Hálfdánarson (Jun 24)
- RE: Honeypot detection and countermeasures Brass, Phil (ISS Atlanta) (Jun 18)
- Re: Honeypot detection and countermeasures Larry Colen (Jun 18)
- Re: Honeypot detection and countermeasures Michael Boman (Jun 19)
- RE: Honeypot detection and countermeasures Rob Shein (Jun 23)
- Re: Honeypot detection and countermeasures Dragos Ruiu (Jun 24)
- Re: Honeypot detection and countermeasures Lance Spitzner (Jun 24)
- Re: Honeypot detection and countermeasures Larry Colen (Jun 18)
- Re: SV: Honeypot detection and countermeasures dave (Jun 24)
- RE: Honeypot detection and countermeasures Michael Boman (Jun 24)
- RE: Honeypot detection and countermeasures Rob Shein (Jun 24)
- RE: Honeypot detection and countermeasures .:[ Death Star]:. (Jun 25)
- RE: Honeypot detection and countermeasures Bojan Zdrnja (Jun 25)