RE: SV: Honeypot detection and countermeasures

["Lampe, John W." <JWLAMPE () GAPAC com>]

If you lump LaBrea in with these honeypots (and I don't see why you wouldn't), then the check is trivial (in fact, 
NESSUS can optionally check for the existence of LaBrea prior to launching nmap...that's nice)

some of the pricey honeypots (hi ManTrap) are trivial as well.  

And, when youve found some anomalous box on the network, it's always nifty to run a blackbox IP ID scanner against it 
(i.e. if the machine uses simple incrementing IP IDs, then record the ID every minute for a couple of days, then check 
back to see when the box traffic peaks...you might not find a honeypot, but you'll find lots of those reverse proxy / 
vpn thingees)



> -----Original Message-----
> From: dave () immunitysec com [mailto:dave () immunitysec com] 
> Sent: Tuesday, June 24, 2003 10:45 AM
> To: pen-test () securityfocus com
> Subject: Re: SV: Honeypot detection and countermeasures
>
>
> Well, that's a great way to think about it - as a test of 
> your countermeasures. In fact, there are MANY ways to both 
> remotely and locally detect various breeds of honeypots. 
> VMWare, for example, uses a particular range of MAC 
> addresses, among other things. I always find it funny when 
> people use VMWare as a security measure.
>
> But (imho) it's a truly RARE penetration test team that will 
> notice some of these subtle things, and basically no 
> pentration test teams can remotely discover a honeypot - the 
> technology for doing so just isn't public enough yet. (Well, 
> I just gave away that MAC address trick, but it's limited to 
> the local net, and there are lots of other, better tricks).
>
> Dave Aitel
> Immunity, Inc.
> http://www.immunitysec.com/
>
>
>
>
>
> > But...the last thing, since that was commented (but was 
> removed from 
> > the thread I'm answering on). If you hire a company to do a 
> pentest, 
> > of course you don't tell them about your countermessaures. 
> The pentest 
> > is the exam for the system you have deployed, and the guys 
> that tests 
> > you are the examiners. The result from the pentest should/might 
> > include that, yes, they found the honeypots, and it distracted them 
> > for some time before they understood what they had hit (a 
> honeypot is 
> > just another countermeassure), and then the rest of the 
> report comes.
> > If you want to pentest a new service, then of course point them at 
> > that service. If you want to pentest your company...then 
> that's what 
> > you tell them.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Trygve Aasheim
> > Manager, Network Security
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Opprinnelig melding-----
> > Fra: Rob Shein [mailto:shoten () starpower net]
> > Sendt: 23. juni 2003 15:58
> > Til: 'Michael Boman'; 'Larry Colen'
> > Kopi: 'Brass, Phil (ISS Atlanta)'; pen-test () securityfocus com
> > Emne: RE: Honeypot detection and countermeasures
> >
> >
> > This wouldn't work.  Seeing the packets/traffic on the wire doesn't 
> > tell you the tools that are used, and it also doesn't 
> really give you 
> > much else. Considering that a honeypot is either not really 
> rootable 
> > (DTK) or is very low hanging fruit (and very rootable, like a 
> > honeynet.org system), they either won't see tools downloaded to the 
> > system or won't see anything more than the bare minimum needed to 
> > exploit a system that is too vulnerable to begin with.
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Michael Boman [mailto:michael.boman () securecirt com]
> > > Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2003 11:32 PM
> > > To: Larry Colen
> > > Cc: Brass, Phil (ISS Atlanta); pen-test () securityfocus com
> > > Subject: Re: Honeypot detection and countermeasures
> > >
> > >
> > > On Wed, 2003-06-18 at 10:15, Larry Colen wrote:
> > > > Good point. I was more envisioning a scenario where the 
> client was 
> > > > testing the whole security system, including the honeypots. I.e. 
> > > > hiring a pen-tester without giving the pen-tester any
> > > knowldege of the
> > > > system before hand.
> > > >
> > > > If I seem like a clueless newbie, I hope that I at least
> > > seem like a
> > > > polite clueless newbie. I'll crawl back into my hole and 
> lurk a bit 
> > > > more.
> > > >
> > > >    Larry
> > >
> > > There is a viable scenario for this. Let's say ACME Inc. 
> wants to do 
> > > their own pen-tests because they
> > >  - Don't like to pay outsiders to do it
> > >  - Want to compete with the company
> > >  - They want to steal their tools and techniques
> > >  - insert your own paranoid explanation for the "why" bit
> > >
> > > They hire a group of people to hack their systems and record 
> > > everything so once the exercise is over ACME Inc. now 
> knows the tools 
> > > and techniques of that particular pen test group.
> > >
> > > It's unlikely, but possible. Haven't happen to me (yet).
> > >
> > > Best regards
> > >  Michael Boman
> > >
> > > --
> > > Michael Boman
> > > Security Architect, SecureCiRT Pte Ltd http://www.securecirt.com
>
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