Re: Issue with Noction IRP default setting (Was: BGP route hijack by AS10990)

[Ryan Hamel <ryan () rkhtech org>]

Job,

I disagree on the fact that it is not fair to the BGP implementation ecosystem, to enforce a single piece of software 
to activate the no-export community by default, due to ignorance from the engineer(s) implementing the solution. It 
should be common sense that certain routes that should be advertised beyond the local AS, just like RFC1918 routes, and 
more. Also, wasn't it you that said Cisco routers had a bug in ignoring NO_EXPORT? Would you go on a rant with Cisco, 
even if Noction add that enabled checkbox by default?
Why are you not on your soap box about BIRD, FRrouting, OpenBGPd, Cisco, Juniper, etc... about how they can possibly 
allow every day screw ups to happen, but the same options like the NO_EXPORT community are available for the engineer 
to use? One solution would be to implement "BGP Group/Session Profiles" (ISP/RTBH/DDOS Filtering/Route Optimizers/etc) 
or a "BGP Session Wizard" (ask the operator questions about their intentions), then automatically generate import and 
export policies based on known accepted practices.
Another solution could be having the BGP daemon disclose the make, model family, and exact model of hardware it is 
running on, to BGP peers, and add more knobs into policy creation to match said values, and take action appropriately. 
That would be useful in getting around vendor specific issues, as well as belt & suspenders protection.
Ryan
On Aug 1 2020, at 9:58 am, Job Snijders <job () instituut net> wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 01, 2020 at 06:50:55AM -0700, Ca By wrote:
> > I am not normally supporting a heavy hand in regulation, but i think it is
> > fair to say Noction and similar BGP optimizers are unsafe at any speed and
> > the FTC or similar should ban them in the USA. They harm consumers and are
> > a risk to national security / critical infrastructure
> >
> > Noction and similar could have set basic defaults (no-export, only create
> > /25 bogus routes to limit scope), but they have been clear that their greed
> > to suck up traffic does not benefit from these defaults and they wont do
> > it.
>
> Following a large scale BGP incident in March 2015, noction made it
> possible to optionally set the well-known NO_EXPORT community on route
> advertisements originated by IRP instances.
>
> "In order to further reduce the likelihood of these problems
> occurring in the future, we will be adding a feature within Noction
> IRP to give an option to tag all the more specific prefixes that it
> generates with the BGP NO_EXPORT community. This will not be enabled
> by default [snip]"
> https://www.noction.com/blog/route-optimizers
> Mar 27, 2015
>
> Due to NO_EXPORT not being set in the default configuration, there are
> probably if not certainly many unsuspecting network engineers who end up
> deploying this software - without ever even considering - to change that
> one setting in the configuration.
>
> Fast forward a few years and a few incidents, on the topic of default
> settings, following the Cloudflare/DQE/Verizon incident:
>
> "We do have no export community support and have done for many
> years. The use of more specifics is also optional. Neither replaces
> the need for filters."
> https://twitter.com/noction/status/1143177562191011840
> Jun 24, 2019
>
> Community members responded:
> "Noction have been facilitating Internet outages for years and
> years and the best thing they can say in response is that it is
> technically possible to use their product responsibly, they just
> don't ship it that way."
> https://twitter.com/PowerDNS_Bert/status/1143252745257979905
> June 24, 2019
>
> Last year Noction stated:
> "Nobody found this leak pleasant."
> https://www.noction.com/news/incident-response
> June 26, 2019
>
> Sentiment we all can agree with, change is needed!
> As far as I know, Noction IRP is the ONLY commercially available
> off-the-shelf BGP route manipulation software which - as default - does
> NOT set the BGP well-known NO_EXPORT community on the product's route
> advertisements. This is a product design decision which causes
> collateral damage.
>
> I would like to urge Noction to reconsider their position. Seek to
> migrate the existing users to use NO_EXPORT, and release a new version
> of the IRP software which sets NO_EXPORT BY DEFAULT on all generated
> routes.
>
> Kind regards,
> Job