nanog mailing list archives

RE: Update to BCP-38?


From: Mark Collins <mark.collins () mariestopes org>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2019 13:59:58 +0000

Not everyone attacking your systems is going to have the skills or knowledge to get in though - simple tricks (like 
hiding what web server you use) can prevent casual attacks from script kiddies and others who aren't committed to 
targeting you, freeing your security teams to focus on the serious threats.

Mark

-----Original Message-----
From: NANOG <nanog-bounces () nanog org> On Behalf Of Rich Kulawiec
Sent: 08 October 2019 14:51
To: nanog () nanog org
Subject: Re: Update to BCP-38?

On Tue, Oct 08, 2019 at 01:35:16PM +0100, Mike Meredith via NANOG wrote:
You've ignored step 1 - identifying critical information that needs
protecting. It makes sense to protect information that needs
protecting and don't lose sleep over information that doesn't need
protecting. Not many of us are planning an invasion of a Nazi-infected Europe any time soon.

We are heading toward a restatement of Kerckhoff's principle/Shannon's maxim, the latter of which can be paraphrased as 
"design systems assuming that your adversary will know as much about them as you do".

Not that I'm advocating publishing all internal design documents, but systems whose security is predicated on the 
secrecy of those are brittle and likely to be badly compromised.  Better to assume that enemies know or can find out 
everything and design/build accordingly.

---rsk
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