nanog mailing list archives

Re: DDOS Simulation


From: alvin nanog <nanogml () Mail DDoS-Mitigator net>
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:50:53 -0700


hi roland

- yup... agreed on most all of your points ...

- good referral to prev ddos discussions

- i'm just saying ..
        if one cannot defend and know that their ddos mitigation
        is working on the low level free script kiddie ddos attacks,
        they should not worry about scaling to gigabit/s, 1terabit/sec
        or even 100 terabit/s ddos attacks ... 

        one has to start somewhere and grow their ddos mitigation and 
        ddos attacks knowledge ... i happen to need to know how to
        defend my customers in between the free script kiddies and the 
        types of attacks that make the papers/new

        start with free (thousands) of ddos attack tools and (hundreds)
        of free ddos mitigaton tools

- i'm fairly certain i can fill any pipe with jibberish data
  where ddos mitigation might not work as expected .... but when the cops 
  come knocking, the ddos attackers are in deeep kah kah, thus requiring
  prior legal paperwork of all those directly and indirectly involved 

have fun
alvin

On 07/30/15 at 03:05am, Roland Dobbins wrote:
On 30 Jul 2015, at 2:38, alvin nanog wrote:

there is no need to pay people to attack your servers ...

Unless you don't have the expertise to do it yourself.  Again, I advocate an
organic defense capability and an organic testing capability, but there are
many organizations which unfortunately don't have these, and they must start
somewhere.

    - tcpdump and wireshark will tell you everything the attackers are
    doing to your network right now that needs to be defended against

On small, single-homed networks, sure.  On networks of any size, this
doesn't scale.

Flow telemetry scales.

if a mid-level wanna be attacker wants to target your servers, they're
just as equally easy to mitigate and prevent and probably sending you
100,000 "ddos packets" per second because they can ( bigger zombie network
:-)

100kpps is nothing.  Of course, so many servers/services are so brittle,
fragile, and non-scalable that most DDoS attacks are overkill by orders of
magnitude.

if you are being targeted by "masters of deception" you have no solution
other than get local law enforcement involved to track down the
originating
attackers

I'm not sure who or what 'masters of deception' are in this context, but
attribution has nothing to do with DDoS defense.

Defending against serious attackers with lots of resources is taking place
every minute of every hour of every day.  There are many techniques and
tools available, most of which have been discussed multiple times on this
list over the years.  Here's one such example:

<http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2010-January/016747.html>

all ddos mitigations is almost 100% guaranteed to fail a volumetric
DDoS attacks ....

This is incorrect.

the DDoS attackrs probably have access to a bigger zombie
network than most major corp ...

This is true, in many cases - and is also not an issue for
properly-provisioned, coordinated DDoS defense mechanisms and methodologies.

the attackers job is not to get caught and
is not ez to be hiding if law enforcement wanted to catch them :-)

Again, attribution is a completely separate issue.

    nping "send 100,000 packets/sec" x 65,000byte/packet  192.168.0.0/16

FYI, 'line-rate' for 64-byte packets at 10gb/sec is ~14.8mpps.

by the same premise, if i had to pick ONE ddos mitigation strategy, i'd
tarpit all incoming TCP-based ddos attacks which should crash the
attacking zombie server under sustained tcp-based ddos attacks

There is no one tactic (this is not a strategy) which can be picked, as any
kind of traffic can be used for DDoS attacks.  With regards to TCP-based
attacks, it's a subset of those which are connection-oriented and are thus
susceptible to tarpitting-type techniques.

-----------------------------------
Roland Dobbins <rdobbins () arbor net>


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