Re: PRISM: NSA/FBI Internet data mining project

[Owen DeLong <owen () delong com>]

On Jun 21, 2013, at 5:10 PM, Phil Fagan <philfagan () gmail com> wrote:

> I would think this is only an issue if they throw out the Fourth in that when they use that data collected 
> "inadvertantly" to build a case a against you they use no other data collected under a proper warrant.

That statement ignores a longstanding legal principle known as "fruit of the poison tree".

>  If the purpose was to actually collect data on you, in the event you do something , they can simply run a query 
> against this data post court order...then that's crossing the line.

Indeed, they don't even seem to be required to bother with the court order any more. The standing FISA order seems to 
pretty much allow them to do all the required line crossing without any additional court order.

>  I personally think there is nothing wrong with monitoring US communications - big difference between monitoring US 
> communications and monitoring US persons communications.

It's pretty clear that they are likely monitoring both.

Owen

> On Fri, Jun 21, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Dan White <dwhite () olp net> wrote:
> On 06/09/13 11:10 -0500, Dan White wrote:
> Let me put my gold tipped tinfoil hat on in response to your statement.
>
> http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
>
> If accurate, this is extremely concerning:
>
>
>
>   Top secret documents submitted to the court that oversees surveillance by US
>   intelligence agencies show the judges have signed off on broad orders which
>   allow the NSA to make use of information "inadvertently" collected from
>   domestic US communications without a warrant.
>
>   The documents show that even under authorities governing the collection of
>   foreign intelligence from foreign targets, US communications can still be
>   collected, retained and used.
>
>   ...However, alongside those provisions, the Fisa court-approved policies
>   allow the NSA to:
>
>   • Keep data that could potentially contain details of US persons for up
>     to five years;
>
>     Retain and make use of "inadvertently acquired" domestic communications
>     if they contain usable intelligence, information on criminal activity,
>     threat of harm to people or property, are encrypted, or are believed to
>     contain any information relevant to cybersecurity;
>
>
>
> All protections afforded by the fourth amendment have essentially been
> thrown into the (rather large) bit bucket by the FISA court, when it comes
> to any bits which leave your premise.
>
> -- 
> Dan White
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> Phil Fagan
> Denver, CO
> 970-480-7618