nanog mailing list archives

Re: ISP port blocking practice


From: Franck Martin <franck () genius com>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2010 15:56:46 +1200 (FJT)

Blocking outbound port 25 in certain conditions (mainly anything with a dynamic IPv4), is a recommended practice from 
MAAWG.org and others, they have a few useful documents for ISPs to deal with their network.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Owen DeLong" <owen () delong com>
To: "Zhiyun Qian" <zhiyunq () umich edu>
Cc: "NANOG list" <nanog () nanog org>
Sent: Friday, 3 September, 2010 3:48:20 PM
Subject: Re: ISP port blocking practice

We should be seeking to stop damaging the network for ineffective anti spam measures (blocking outbound 25 for example) 
rather than to expand this practice to bidirectional brokenness.

Owen

Sent from my iPad

On Sep 3, 2010, at 12:25 PM, Zhiyun Qian <zhiyunq () umich edu> wrote:

I skimmed through these specs. They are useful but seems only related specific to IP spoofing prevention. I see that 
IP spoofing is part of the asymmetric routing story. But I was more thinking that given that IP spoofing is not 
widely adopted, the other defenses that they can more perhaps more easily implement is to block incoming traffic with 
source port 25 (if they already decided to block outgoing traffic with destination port 25). But according to our 
study, most of the ISPs didn't do that at the time of study (probably still true today).

-Zhiyun
On Sep 2, 2010, at 9:20 PM, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:

BCP38 / RFC2827 were created specifically to address some quite
similar problems.  And googling either of those two strings on nanog
will get you a lot of griping and/or reasons as to why these aren't
being more widely adopted :)

--srs

On Fri, Sep 3, 2010 at 7:47 AM, Zhiyun Qian <zhiyunq () umich edu> wrote:
Suresh, thanks for your interest. I see you've had a lot of experience in fighting spam, so you must have known 
this. Yes, I know this spamming technique has been around for a while. But it's surprising to see that the majority 
of the ISPs that we studied are still vulnerable to this attack.  That probably indicates that it is not as widely 
known as we would expect. So I thought it would be beneficial to raise the awareness of the problem.

In terms of more results, the paper is the most detailed document we have. Otherwise, if you interested in the data 
that we collected (which ISPs or IP ranges are vulnerable to this attack). We can chat offline.

Regards.
-Zhiyun





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