Re: Encrypted files and the 5th amendment

[Callum Finlayson <callum.finlayson () gmail com>]

The point is that it's essentially impossible to whether there's any  
encrypted partition present (or how many).

Sent from my iPhone

On 12 Jul 2011, at 22:21, Tim <tim-security () sentinelchicken org> wrote:

> > > Tim, I actually use TruCrypt now to do exactly what you speak  
> > > of.   I pre-allocate a fixed virtual disk, and use one passcode  
> > > for one section of data and a different passcode for a different  
> > > section of data.   It is impossible to determine if the disk is  
> > > set up in this manner, and impossible to tell which section of  
> > > data is being used.   It is actually quite easy to do.
> >
> > All fine and dandy until the authorities say "Your honor, the  
> > defendant
> > is using nested encryption, we didn't find the
> > $self_incriminating_evidence so he obviously hasn't complied with our
> > request".
> >
> > double-edged sword.
>
>
> Yeah, exactly.  Any investigator worth their salt will be able to tell
> the partition that got decrypted is not big enough to account for
> encrypted disk space.  That's where the one-time pad can create true
> plausible deniability, if used correctly.  Any ciphertext of length N
> can decrypt to any plaintext of length N.  Too bad it is too much of a
> pain to implement in practice.
>
> Thor: maybe you could make the investigator's job harder through a
> combination of compression and encryption with a similar
> dual-partition scheme as you're using with trucrypt.
>
> tim
>
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