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Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)
From: phil () jabea net
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2010 09:37:49 -0500
If a bad guy got the local admin password, then the computer is in it's control at 100%. No need to run script as a domain user, as the local admin can already format the drive, or remove all security mesure. The cached credential is a hash of a hash. (kinda long to crack) Any good network admin would use a account that can only join a computer in the domain, and use the local admin account to install software or a helpdesk account that got local admin right. The only case maybe that case is a security hole that I can think of, I told maybe because I didn't tested it. It's if the computer got a local mssql with mixed mode authentification. Does the trick permit the login to the database if you installed it with a domain user, that is cached on the computer? (But who care, as the local admin can just copy the data dir anyway) My .02 cent -phil
Correct me if I'm wrong, but here is what I think of that : A Domain user that is a Local admin of his workstation is different than a Domain user which is Domain Admin. Then, a local admin whose account is an AD account can run scripts *on his local machine* in the name of the domain admin. This includes the possibility of dumping the Domain Admin password hash and even *all the domain accounts password hashes* (ie: psexec + pwdump against the DC, with the privileges of the domain admin). An exploitation scenario could be the following for an unprivileged domain user: - Become local admin of his workstation (bunch of methods out there) - Run script ad the Domain Admin with this technique) - Recover Domain admin or Domain Users password hashes. - Crack the passwords and become Domain Admin (ie: Administrator of all workstations and servers in the domain). My two cents ! J- On 10/12/2010 15:37, Jeffrey Walton wrote:On Thu, Dec 9, 2010 at 10:07 PM, Thor (Hammer of God) <thor () hammerofgod com> wrote:What do you mean by "regular local administrator"? You're a local admin, or you're not.I believe the OP's intent was to differentiate between Local Administrators and Domain (or Enterprise) Administrators. Corrections from StenoPlasma are welcomed.There are not degrees of local admin.But there are different accounts, both domain and local, which have administrator rights and privileges on the local machine. [SNIP] Jeff _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/_______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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Current thread:
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002), (continued)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Thor (Hammer of God) (Dec 09)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Mike Hale (Dec 10)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Thor (Hammer of God) (Dec 09)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Mike Vasquez (Dec 09)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Marsh Ray (Dec 09)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Thor (Hammer of God) (Dec 10)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Mike Hale (Dec 10)
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- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Thor (Hammer of God) (Dec 10)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Thor (Hammer of God) (Dec 09)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Thor (Hammer of God) (Dec 10)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Jeremy SAINTOT (Dec 13)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) phil (Dec 13)
- Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002) Stefan Kanthak (Dec 13)