Re: HTTP AUTH BASIC monowall.

[Keith <keseymour () rochester rr com>]

Does this console have to face the Internet?

Why not put the management console in a protected environment with a VPN 
 doing the authentication to the subnet that would allow you to manage 
it? You should be able to protect the web interface and still allow the 
managed devices to report to it.

Of course if it is as weak as you say that may not help - you could 
probably attack the interface that receives reports from the client 
machines.

Good luck with that,

Keith


Simon Smith wrote:
> List,
>     SSL is not a fix for the problem, SSL is just a way of evading the
> issue or hiding the hole. I can bypass SSL with a man in the middle
> attack (which I've already done several times). Once I bypass SSL I am
> able to capture the http headers and extract the auth string. The auth
> string is vulnerable because it is only a base64 hash. I just reverse
> the hash, then presto, I have firewall access... or better still....
>
>     Lets take this a step further. There is a tool that I have been
> researching for some time. This tool doesn't even use SSL (which really
> scares me) and is used for centralized web based computer system
> management. This tool enables the administrators to perform tasks such
> as mass software installation, mass software removal, record emails, and
> even record keystrokes. This tool is a standard tool used by IT
> companies around the world to manage their clients networks.
>
>     The console for this tool exists on the Internet and is PHP driven.
> Login to the console is also plain text and basic auth. If an attacker
> can successfully compromise the console (not difficult at all), then the
> attacker is in a prime position to extort companies being managed by
> this tool. This is possible because the exposure and damage caused to
> the company by going after the attacker would be far greater than just
> paying the attacker off. (Don't bother asking me what tool this is, I am
> not going to tell anyone because that would cross my ethical boundaries.)
>
>     So, I guess I've really answered my own question, perhaps I should
> release some sort of an advisory on all of these products that are using
> basic auth. Basic auth is not really providing anyone with any security.
> Maybe they feel good because they need to type in a username and a
> password? Would they feel so good if they knew what was really happening?
>
>     What is the solution to this problem? Is there a solution that does
> not require a different auth type?
>
>    
>
>    
>
>    
>
> Jeremy Bishop wrote:
> > On Monday 13 March 2006 11:56, Matthijs van Otterdijk wrote:
> >   
> > > except for that SSH uses RSA, which uses a public and private key. If
> > > the password is encrypted during the transfer to the site, and can
> > > only get decrypted there, then it can't possibly be sniffed with some
> > > computer inbetween, can it?
> > >     
> > As Tim mentioned, the question isn't about the information getting to a 
> > site securely, it's about whether that site is the correct one and not 
> > an impostor.
> >
> > (I think the original poster was referring to SSL, not SSH, but that is 
> > really immaterial to the question.)
> >
> > Jeremy
> >
> >   

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