Re: info on ip spoofing please

["Ian stuart Turnbull" <ian.t7 () hotmail co uk>]

Yee-hah! And there we have it in a nutshell. Such an easy asnwer when you 
know,
I'm in your debt for this. Many many thanks. Now I'll get some sleep tonight 
- great.
Best regards,
Ian t

> From: Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu
> To: Ian stuart Turnbull <ian.t7 () hotmail co uk>
> CC: bmenrigh () ucsd edu, full-disclosure () lists grok org uk
> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] info on ip spoofing please Date: Tue, 11 Apr 
> 2006 17:11:53 -0400
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> On Tue, 11 Apr 2006 21:54:50 BST, Ian stuart Turnbull said:
> > Excellent response Brendon. Thanks heaps.
> > I was reading the infamous Markoff / Tsutomu Shimomura attack at
>
> That was *Mitnick*, not Markoff - Markoff wrote a book or 3 about it later.
>
> > http://www.totse.com/en/hack/hack_attack/hacker03.html
> >
> > and I guess I assumed that as they did not know each other personally 
> then
> > Markoff must have found a way to locate 2 computers conversing with each
> > other randomly? Perhaps this assumption was not correct?
> > Though from the test it appears Markoff DID find a way of doing this - 
> ie,
> > finding 2 computers talking to each other NOT on his own LAN / 
> network???
>
> Well, at that time, it was a pretty good guess that if you found hostnames
> george.site.dom, paul.site.dom, john.site.dom, and ringo.site.dom, and all 
> 4
> had rsh enabled, that there was a lot of rsh traffic between them, and 
> likely
> a .rhost trust between them so you wouldn't need a password....
>
> And what Mitnick's attack did *wasnt* finding 2 computers *talking*.
> In fact, the attack relied on finding a trusted computer *not* talking (or
> making it not talk).
>
> What he did was:
>
> 1) Bash george.site.dom over the head with SYN packets to make it STFU.
> 2) Send paul.site.dom a forged SYN packet claiming to be from george.
> 3) Paul sends a syn/ack to george, who can't send an RST because it's STFU.
> 4) send a forged ACK for the syn/ack claiming to be from george.
> 5) Send the rest of the TCP datastream.
>
> The only tough part is knowing what ISN will be on the syn/ack so you can
> ack it properly - and in that day, just poking its 'finger' port or 
> something,
> noting *that* ISN, and adding 32K or similar constant was almost guaranteed 
> to work.


> << attach3 >>

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