Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Re: Authorities eye MSBlaster suspect


From: "morning_wood" <se_cur_ity () hotmail com>
Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2003 12:22:19 -0700

shouldnt these measures been in place already?
instead of rushing on a per-incident basis, you should be implimenting
these things anyway. IMHO is prudent to expend some overkill
during lockdown and penetration testing on a system when
it is deployed or periodically tested, so there is a reduction
during a per-incident basis. You still not taking responsibility
to the proper party - the admin or security administrator
of said computing resource. They are the ones responsible
for allowing internet egress into thier networks, a known hostile
environment. 

get educated, take some responsibility for you high paying job, 
and quit trying to lay the blame elsewhere.

Donnie Werner
http://e2-labs.com 






----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Chris DeVoney" <cdevoney () u washington edu>
To: <full-disclosure () lists netsys com>
Sent: Friday, August 29, 2003 10:39 AM
Subject: RE: [Full-disclosure] Authorities eye MSBlaster suspect


On Friday, August 29, 2003 8:24 AM, Charles Ballowe wrote:
Interesting -- the net cost of the worm is actually a net 
$0.00. For every penny that a company chalks up as a cost to 
the worm, some other company must be chalking up the cost as 
a profit from the worm. 

Forgive the comment, but that statement is very untrue. As someone else
hinted, companies are diverting manpower from other projects to tackle the
worm. No other company is benefitting from that expenditure.

Then there is the case of academic and medical establishments, of which I
can speak from experience. There were some additional costs in hiring
contractors. But the biggest cost was the diversion of (my estimate)
hundreds of man-weeks to analyzing, patching, remediating, mitigating these
worms from other projects. That wasn't money lost, that was time lost. And
the faculty, staff, students, and everyone who depends on that work loss.

I won't go into fuller details, but because of the heavy dependence of
computing in biotechnology and medical fields, these worms and other
security problems have a larger societial cost. Most university medical
research comes from fixed grants. When you are always trying make those
limited resources stretch, diverting money and time to nonsense like this is
very, very frustrating. These problems do delay medical research and adds to
the cost of medical research without giving human benefits. 

I wish these misceates would consider those implications before converting a
lab server into a warez server when they get hit with a leading-edge or rare
illness. 

cdv

------------------------
Chris DeVoney
Clinical Research Center Informatics
University of Washington
cdevoney () u washington edu
206-598-6816 
------------------------


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