Re: Definition of Zero Day Protection

["Stephen P. Berry" <spb () meshuggeneh net>]

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David Maynor writes:

> Generic methods for 0day protection, like hooking functions called
> by shellcode, will always fail.

Well, any generic method someone is trying to sell you will always fail.
Here's a generic method that prevents zero-day exploits (for just about
any value of `zero-day'):

        -Deny all

The upgraded version of this strategy (where `upgrade' here is defined
in the marketing sense of `more useable, more broken'):

        -Default deny all
        -Permit only what is known good
        -When you're architecting the points of exposure first think
         about containment.  Then give some thought to containment.  Finally,
         worry about containment

In other words, a successful `zero-day' protection strategy really looks
an awful lot like a successful infosec strategy in general:  rely on
what you've designed into the system, not what you're expecting some
vendor to miracle into it after it's deployed.




- -spb

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