IDS mailing list archives
RE: Cisco CTR
From: "Rob Shein" <shoten () starpower net>
Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2003 11:13:55 -0500
There's nothing unsubstantiated about it at all. Look at the code for some of the exploits, actually READ the code. Few of them have patches, and more to the point, all of the good ones are meant to be small. If you include all the code for the patch in with your shellcode...well, that's not an exploit that is going to be very reliable, in most situations. The true definition of "immediately," meaning "without delay," does not apply here. There is a delay, and while it can be very short, it is far longer than that of CTR's response, which truly is immediate.
-----Original Message----- From: Michael Marziani [mailto:marziani () oasis com] Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 10:47 AM To: Rob Shein; 'Gary Flynn' Cc: 'Liran Chen'; focus-ids () securityfocus com Subject: RE: Cisco CTR-----Original Message----- From: Rob Shein [mailto:shoten () starpower net] Yes, but nobody patches it THAT quickly. CTR actsimmediately, not ahalf-hour later...it would have started scanning by the time the hacker at the other end notices that he has a shell...Please don't make unsubstantiated blanket statements like that. Hackers are skilled sysadmins and programmers who create packaged hacking tools that not only search for and exploit flaws to get them onto a system, but also install programs, disable security features, and yes, patch servers *immediately* once they get inside. A system like Cisco CTR might very well detect the attack before the hacker's program has time to patch, but that all depends on how good the hacker's program is, the state of the network, etc. I'd like to see the results of a live test of such an event. If this type of attack can succeed as I think it could, I think a solution would be for the IDS to keep a record of the patch levels of every system in the network and allow those patch levels to be updated only through an administrative interface (requiring additional authentication and of course increasing the administrative workload). Then the system wouldn't be fooled by this technique. -Michael Michael Marziani IT Consultant Entercede Consulting, Inc.-----Original Message----- From: Gary Flynn [mailto:flynngn () jmu edu] Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 5:58 PM To: Rob Shein Cc: 'Liran Chen'; focus-ids () securityfocus com Subject: Re: Cisco CTR Rob Shein wrote:I think this largely relates to the earlier discussionabout how thereis a difference between a "false positive" and an actualattack thatfails to succeed. Ask yourself this: are you going to want to know about all attacks or just those that have a chance of success? If someone throws IIS attacks at your apacheweb server,doyou want toknow about it...or do you want to wait until they start using apache-compatible exploits? There's a good summary of what CTR does here: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps5054/Another thing to think about - some folks have a habit ofpatchingthe hole they came in through. Just because a vulnerability scan shows no vulnerability it does not mean an attack wasunsuccessful.-- Gary Flynn Security Engineer - Technical Services James Madison University Please R.U.N.S.A.F.E. http://www.jmu.edu/computing/runsafe------------------------------------------------------------------ --------- Network with over 10,000 of the brightest minds in information security at the largest, most highly-anticipated industryevent of theyear. Don't miss RSA Conference 2004! Choose from over 200 class sessions and see demos from more than 250 industry vendors. If your job touches security, you need to be here. Learn more orregister athttp://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/RSA_focus-ids_031023 and use priority code SF4. ------------------------------------------------------------------ ---------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- Network with over 10,000 of the brightest minds in information security at the largest, most highly-anticipated industry event of the year. Don't miss RSA Conference 2004! Choose from over 200 class sessions and see demos from more than 250 industry vendors. If your job touches security, you need to be here. Learn more or register at http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/RSA_focus-ids_031023 and use priority code SF4. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- Cisco CTR Liran Chen (Nov 06)
- RE: Cisco CTR Rob Shein (Nov 06)
- Re: Cisco CTR Gary Flynn (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Rob Shein (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Michael Marziani (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Rob Shein (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Michael Marziani (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Rob Shein (Nov 07)
- Re: Cisco CTR Renaud Deraison (Nov 10)
- Re: Cisco CTR Gary Flynn (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Gary Halleen (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Michael Marziani (Nov 10)
- RE: Cisco CTR Chad R. Skipper (Nov 10)
- RE: Cisco CTR Rob Shein (Nov 06)
- Re: Cisco CTR Joe Bowling (Nov 10)
- RE: Cisco CTR Alan Shimel (Nov 10)
- Re: Cisco CTR John Lampe (Nov 10)