IDS mailing list archives

RE: Cisco CTR


From: "Rob Shein" <shoten () starpower net>
Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2003 11:13:55 -0500

There's nothing unsubstantiated about it at all.  Look at the code for some
of the exploits, actually READ the code.  Few of them have patches, and more
to the point, all of the good ones are meant to be small.  If you include
all the code for the patch in with your shellcode...well, that's not an
exploit that is going to be very reliable, in most situations.  The true
definition of "immediately," meaning "without delay," does not apply here.
There is a delay, and while it can be very short, it is far longer than that
of CTR's response, which truly is immediate.

-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Marziani [mailto:marziani () oasis com] 
Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 10:47 AM
To: Rob Shein; 'Gary Flynn'
Cc: 'Liran Chen'; focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: Cisco CTR


-----Original Message-----
From: Rob Shein [mailto:shoten () starpower net]

Yes, but nobody patches it THAT quickly.  CTR acts 
immediately, not a 
half-hour later...it would have started scanning by the time the 
hacker at the other end notices that he has a shell...

Please don't make unsubstantiated blanket statements like 
that.  Hackers are skilled sysadmins and programmers who 
create packaged hacking tools that not only search for and 
exploit flaws to get them onto a system, but also install 
programs, disable security features, and yes, patch servers
*immediately* once they get inside.

A system like Cisco CTR might very well detect the attack 
before the hacker's program has time to patch, but that all 
depends on how good the hacker's program is, the state of the 
network, etc.  I'd like to see the results of a live test of 
such an event.

If this type of attack can succeed as I think it could, I 
think a solution would be for the IDS to keep a record of the 
patch levels of every system in the network and allow those 
patch levels to be updated only through an administrative 
interface (requiring additional authentication and of course 
increasing the administrative workload).  Then the system 
wouldn't be fooled by this technique.

-Michael

Michael Marziani
IT Consultant
Entercede Consulting, Inc.


-----Original Message-----
From: Gary Flynn [mailto:flynngn () jmu edu]
Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 5:58 PM
To: Rob Shein
Cc: 'Liran Chen'; focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: Re: Cisco CTR




Rob Shein wrote:

I think this largely relates to the earlier discussion
about how there
is a difference between a "false positive" and an actual
attack that
fails to succeed.  Ask yourself this: are you going to want to 
know about all attacks or just those that have a chance of 
success?  If someone throws IIS attacks at your apache 
web server, 
do
you want to
know about it...or do you want to wait until they start using 
apache-compatible exploits?

There's a good summary of what CTR does here: 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps5054/

Another thing to think about - some folks have a habit of 
patching 
the hole they came in through. Just because a vulnerability scan 
shows no vulnerability it does not mean an attack was 
unsuccessful.

--
Gary Flynn
Security Engineer - Technical Services
James Madison University

Please R.U.N.S.A.F.E.
http://www.jmu.edu/computing/runsafe





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Network with over 10,000 of the brightest minds in information security
at the largest, most highly-anticipated industry event of the year.
Don't miss RSA Conference 2004! Choose from over 200 class sessions and
see demos from more than 250 industry vendors. If your job touches
security, you need to be here. Learn more or register at
http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/RSA_focus-ids_031023
and use priority code SF4.
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