Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained

[William bradd <bbradd () olg com>]

Hi,

My .02

Ask one question.  Why do old attacks still work?  Because patches and hot fixes
have not been applied.

Where I work, we constantly scan and report vulnerabilities to management.
Admins say they have fixed the vulnerabilities, yet we still find the same
vulnerabilities over and over. Bottom line they either have not applied the
patch or failed to follow-up and check for settings that may have  been changed
when the patch is applied.

Additionally, end users and admins think patching isn't important because we are
behind two firewalls.  You can imagine their surprise when malicious code gets
in and exploits an old vulnerability.  Especially when applying patches would
have prevented the exploit.  Since we have adequate testing facilities they
can't use that as an excuse for not testing and fielding patches and hot fixes.

Someone has to be held responsible, hopefully someone in management who is
ultimately responsible for the integrity and availability of network resources.

Not patching is dangerous, so is not testing, however, vendors provide patches
for a reason.

Consider what are the liabilities for the individual, corporate officers, and
the company should the worst happen?  What do investors expect?  What about
credibility with customers?  What about individual reputation?

But in the end if you are not in a position to make the call, the responsibility
should rest squarely on the shoulders of those who are.

Maybe if vendors were held accountable for bad code (product liability) we'd
have less bad code.



"Behm, Jeffrey L." wrote:

> > At the very least, jobs should be on the line when companies are
> compromised by code
> > that could have long been prevented by patching of applications and OS's,
> > especially when those patches have been widely available and publicly
> > announced.  Even an arson victim faces penalties if they have violated
>
> I agree with your article as a whole, but take minor exception to the above
> paragraph.
>
> Is the job on the line if there are no or very little resources available to
> test the patches?
> I don't think you aren't suggesting blind application of all security
> related patches released from a given vendor, so how does one decide which
> are the "real" ones to apply, and which are the "ones we don't really need."
> It's the old adage of "apply patches and take a chance of breaking
> something" vs. "don't apply the patch until you are sure you need it" (but
> how are you "sure"?)
>
> I.E. Is my job on the line if I apply a patch and it causes more damage (due
> to my own corporate implementation) than the issue it was supposed to fix?
>
> I will give you that there are some patches that one should apply due to the
> severity of the consequences of not applying it (BIND, Sendmail, and
> others). My point is that if the company is not willing to provide the
> resources (time, hardware, people) needed to properly test the patch(es),
> the job should not be "on the line."
>
> A minor point, perhaps, but with the lack of skilled security admins, and
> unwillingness of companies to provide adequate resource to security
> infrastructure (including patch testing), I don't think all the blame lies
> on the ones that "should have known the patches needed to be applied."
>
> IMHO (and no flame nor offense intended!),
> Jeff
>
> Statements made are my personal opinion and in no way reflect the views of
> any company, corporation, or business.
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: R. DuFresne [mailto:dufresne () sysinfo com]
> > Sent: Thursday, January 03, 02 3:11 AM
> > To: firewall-wizards () nfr net
> > Subject: [fw-wiz] The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or
> > gained
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >                       The Morris worm to Nimda
> >                  how little we've learned or gained
> >
> >
> >                                     by:  Ron DuFresne
> >                                            (c) 2001
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > 2001 was a tumultuous year.  Prior to the September 11 airline
> > attacks on
>
> <snip>
> _______________________________________________
> firewall-wizards mailing list
> firewall-wizards () nfr com
> http://list.nfr.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards

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