Re: Password security

[Bob Bregant II <bregant2 () ILLINOIS EDU>]

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Kevin,

Storing passwords in an encrypted format is not over-the-top at all.  Assuming
that your users are perfect, the biggest risk here is that their personal
information stored in the application could be exposed/modified (there's the C
and the I from the security triad) by a malicious user who gains access to the
password database (either by being one of those authorized users or by
exploiting a weakness in the software).  I'm guessing that the information
stored here isn't all publicly available, and could even include highly
sensitive data like SSNs that would be a major headache if they were
compromised and leaked.

As we know, few users are perfect.  Most everyone reuses passwords, even among
technical staff.  What was previously a matter of the information stored in
that system (which should be a major concern on its own), is now a matter of a
malicious user potentially being able to impersonate this user on any of a
number of other services where they have reused the login.  If they reuse that
password on their email account, then the attacker can now use that to reset
any passwords that were set to something different.  Cleartext passwords (or
poorly hashed ones) are pretty much the worst case scenario in my mind when
talking about potential vulnerabilities in an application.  (Many universities,
mine included, have policies in place that state that no passwords shall be
stored in an unencrypted format.)

Simply encrypting the passwords doesn't prevent everything bad.  The data in
the application could be exposed via other flaws, and all encryption can
eventually be broken by a dedicated attacker who has gotten a copy of the data.
 That's the job of the rest of information security, though.  Encrypted
passwords are a good start and a perfectly reasonable request on your end.

- -- 

Bob Bregant II
Office of Privacy and Information Assurance
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
PGP Key: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3EF5417746B6DF9E

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

On 01/31/2012 05:00 PM, Palmer, Kevin wrote:
> Colleagues,
>   I apologize in advance for the cross listing, but it was suggested that this list may have some interesting 
> responses to this issue.
>
>   I have a question regarding a very large third party CRM vendor.  As expected, the vendor allows users 
> (leads/applicants) to set up password-protected accounts to enter in general and sensitive information about 
> themselves and eventually use this and additional information to submit an application to the institution.  We (Tech 
> staff) have recently learned that the user passwords are stored in clear text, and are available to the employees in 
> admissions who work on the system.
>
>   We have asked about encrypting the passwords, and the vendor has told our folks that no one else in higher 
> education is encrypting passwords and that it would be difficult, leading our admissions/enrollment management folks 
> to question whether or not this is a "best practice".  I think it is simply being prudent, and that there is no 
> reason for anyone to know another persons' authentication credentials.  What are your thoughts?  Is this over-the-top 
> security?
>
> Best regards,
> Kev
>
> Kevin Palmer
> Chief Information Officer
> Columbia College
> 1001 Rogers Street
> Launer 9
> Columbia, MO 65216
> (573)875-7329
> kpalmer () ccis edu<mailto:kpalmer () ccis edu>
> www.ccis.edu<http://www.ccis.edu/>
>
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