Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives

Re: disabling some phishing forms


From: Bob Bayn <bob.bayn () USU EDU>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2012 19:48:47 +0000

Thanks, Mike and Drew, for the reality check.  I'll stick with the local block and let victims at other places fend for 
themselves.  Sometimes you can (should) do only so much.

Bob Bayn          (435)797-2396            IT Security Team
       http://it.usu.edu/security/htm/dont-be-fooled
Office of Information Technology, Utah State University


________________________________
From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv [SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] on behalf of Maloney, 
Michael [mmaloney () MIDDLESEXCC EDU]
Sent: Thursday, January 19, 2012 11:48 AM
To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] disabling some phishing forms

This is especially true if the website becomes subject of an investigation because it was compromised.   I know I 
wouldn’t want my IP address being shown as poking around and deleting files.

I do like Drew suggests, I block the ability for our users to get to them while on campus, and I watch our logs to see 
if anyone has clicked on the link from within the web based mail.

Mike

From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Drew 
Perry
Sent: Thursday, January 19, 2012 12:10 PM
To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] disabling some phishing forms

Bob,
I'd be curious as to the legal implications of making changes to an external server you do not control, even if it were 
suspected to be compromised. Unauthorized access of a computer system can be interpreted many different ways in 
different jurisdictions. As an alternative, I'd recommend a quick call to your firewall admin (who may also be you) to 
temporarily block access from your campus to the offending system while you investigate with the owner. That doesn't 
protect your remote users, but it may be the safer choice from a legal stance.

Drew Perry
Security Analyst
Murray State University
(270) 809-4414
aperry () murraystate edu<mailto:aperry () murraystate edu>

P  Save a tree. Please consider the environment before printing this message.


On Thu, Jan 19, 2012 at 10:00 AM, Bob Bayn <bob.bayn () usu edu<mailto:bob.bayn () usu edu>> wrote:
When a user reports a phish message with a "click here" link that goes to a google doc, it's easy to submit an abuse 
notice using the link at the bottom of the doc form.  If a webserver is compromised, the phisher may install a 
SourceForge phpformgenerator.  I've found in several instances that you can go to the first level directory in the link 
to the form and see the phpformgenerator management screen.  And it often lets anyone who sees the page delete any of 
the forms created by the formgenerator.  That at least temporarily disables the mischief while I contact the site owner 
to check for the compromise.

Bob Bayn          (435)797-2396<tel:%28435%29797-2396>            IT Security Team
       http://it.usu.edu/security/htm/dont-be-fooled
Office of Information Technology, Utah State University




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