Re: disabling some phishing forms

["Maloney, Michael" <mmaloney () MIDDLESEXCC EDU>]

This is especially true if the website becomes subject of an
investigation because it was compromised.   I know I wouldn't want my IP
address being shown as poking around and deleting files.

 

I do like Drew suggests, I block the ability for our users to get to
them while on campus, and I watch our logs to see if anyone has clicked
on the link from within the web based mail.  

 

Mike

 

From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv
[mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Drew Perry
Sent: Thursday, January 19, 2012 12:10 PM
To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] disabling some phishing forms

 

Bob,

I'd be curious as to the legal implications of making changes to an
external server you do not control, even if it were suspected to be
compromised. Unauthorized access of a computer system can be interpreted
many different ways in different jurisdictions. As an alternative, I'd
recommend a quick call to your firewall admin (who may also be you) to
temporarily block access from your campus to the offending system while
you investigate with the owner. That doesn't protect your remote users,
but it may be the safer choice from a legal stance.


Drew Perry
Security Analyst
Murray State University
(270) 809-4414
aperry () murraystate edu <mailto:aperry () murraystate edu> 

 

P  Save a tree. Please consider the environment before printing this
message.





On Thu, Jan 19, 2012 at 10:00 AM, Bob Bayn <bob.bayn () usu edu> wrote:

When a user reports a phish message with a "click here" link that goes
to a google doc, it's easy to submit an abuse notice using the link at
the bottom of the doc form.  If a webserver is compromised, the phisher
may install a SourceForge phpformgenerator.  I've found in several
instances that you can go to the first level directory in the link to
the form and see the phpformgenerator management screen.  And it often
lets anyone who sees the page delete any of the forms created by the
formgenerator.  That at least temporarily disables the mischief while I
contact the site owner to check for the compromise.

 

Bob Bayn          (435)797-2396 <tel:%28435%29797-2396>             IT
Security Team
       http://it.usu.edu/security/htm/dont-be-fooled
Office of Information Technology, Utah State University