Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives

Re: two-factor OTP systems


From: Chris Gauthier <cgauthie () PCC EDU>
Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2009 22:15:32 -0700

Gary,

Steve Gibson (of grc.com) does a very in-depth review of the Yubikey and
how he found it at the 2008 RSA Conference.  He talked about it in Show
143.  He has continual updates on it over time.

http://www.grc.com/securitynow.htm -or- http://twit.tv/sn143

It is a fabulous little key that can work for both OTP and static
passwords.  The OTP password is 64 characters and generated using a
256-bit AES encryption algorithm.  As explained to me, each character of
the OTP generated falls in the character set of /[0-9a-zA-Z]/, there is
something about only 4 bits of each character being used.  It was a
while ago that I looked up that explanation, so I'm very rusty on it.

It's big enough of an item now that Google is using it for
authentication to Google Apps.  TrueCrypt is also using it.  In fact,
Yubico made a small modification to their firmware to better accommodate
Yubikeys.  There are several payware utilities out there for integrating
Yubikey OTP's into AD.  I have not looked at them.  The keys themselves
are cheap though.  I bought 2 at $25/ea to try out.  Apparently, they do
have volume discounts.  I have not yet put it into production, mostly
because I have not found the right application in my environment.  I
think they would be good for VPNs, though.

Sorry this is so late of a response.  I have not kept up on the list as
much as I like.

Chris Gauthier
Network Administrator
MaPS Credit Union
Salem, OR 97309

#### Disclaimer ####
I do NOT work for Portland Community College anymore.  Opinions
expressed are mine alone and I am not a vendor trying to sell or
advertise any products on any mailing lists.  I appreciate the tolerance
of the Educause community to my infrequent postings with the occasional
question or experience to share.  I learn a lot from this group and will
not abuse that privilege.
####


Gary Dobbins wrote:
Just yesterday someone showed me a slick new offering in the OTP keyfob space.
yubico.com, it's a relatively new product but seems to be gaining traction, especially in Europe (it is based in 
Sweden).

Looks like a thin tab of plastic, but has USB prongs on one end, a button in the middle, and hangs on a keychain.  When inserted 
in a USB port, the computer sees it as a USB keyboard, and when you press the button it "types" a very long text 
password based on a private key.  The leading characters of the password are fixed, which permits linking it to an account 
(userID).  You operate (or buy time from) a backend authentication server that can tell if the hash just typed is valid for that 
ID.

I can't offer any substantive endorsement, having used it only once, but I would definitely give it a look.  When you 
consider things like how it will withstand a run through someone's washing machine, this looks like a survivor.



-----Original Message-----
From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv
[mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Matthew Dalton
Sent: Thursday, April 02, 2009 3:41 PM
To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] two-factor OTP systems

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Hash: SHA1

All,

Has anyone explored Phone Factor (www.phonefactor.com) for this
purpose?
 It has many of these advantages, but I don't know enough about it
to
get a good measure of the risks.

- --
Matthew Dalton
Director of Information Security
Office of Information Technology
Ohio University
Phone: 740-597-1914

Tyler T. Schoenke wrote:

Gary,

I agree with you about using cell phones for two-factor

authentication.

  I think that is the most practical solution for most vendors.

Like

you said, high-risk environments will want to continue using

token

devices.

I recall hearing about China using cell phone text messages to
authenticate credit card transactions.  When someone makes a

purchase,

the vendor swipes the card, and the credit card company texts an
authorization code to that person's phone.  They tell the code to

the

vendor, who keys it back in to complete the transaction.  So if

someone

steals your credit card info, they can't use it without also

stealing

your cell phone.

I think the big advantage with text messages is that you can have

thirty

higher-risk accounts all sending texts to your cell phone.  That

is much

nicer than carrying around thirty tokens.

Tyler

--
Tyler Schoenke
IT Security Office
University of Colorado - Boulder


Gary Flynn wrote:

jeff murphy wrote:

I'm looking for experiences/recommendations on two-factor OTP

systems

suitable for plugging into RADIUS and/or Active Directory.

I'd be particularly interested in systems that can use

smartphones as

the token generator. Google lead me to:

http://www.deepnetsecurity.com/products2/MobileID.asp

but I haven't found much else on that front.

Did you get any other responses? I'm interested in using
phones too. I ran across the following a while back but
I'm getting ready to start looking again...

http://www.phonefactor.com/
http://motp.sourceforge.net/

There is a lot of stuff on the net now


http://www.google.com/search?q=cell+phone+authentication&hl=en&star
t=30&sa=N

It seems to me using cellphones that most people carry
these days as a second factor would do a lot to get
rid of reusable passwords at a reasonable cost with
a lot less impact than singe use token devices. This would
be particularly useful for populations and applications
where mandating a more traditional two factor system
where justification was marginal.

I know the cell phone based schemes aren't as strong as
traditional 2-factor but if they're more likely to be
implemented and stop 98% of the problems with reusable
passwords, what's not to like? Stronger methods can be
reserved for those applications where that 2% poses a
high risk.

Heck, even I finally broke down and got a cell phone
a couple years ago when I said I never would. Now
I'm looking for a smart phone (actually a mobile
computer with voice capabilities). :)


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