Re: Re[2]: Flash Drive Policy

["Lucas Lyon" <lucas.security () gmail com>]

Windows Operating systems make a clear distinction between USB storage
devices, and USB input devices.

USB Storage devices may be disabled completely in the windows
registry, and USB keyboards and mice will still function normally.

On Microsoft windows systems, the following key controls functionality
of USB storage devices:

 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsbStor

The  'Start' value disables/enables USB storage.

Switch this value to 4, and USB storage devices are disabled.

Switch this value to 3, and USB storage devices are enabled.

Additionally, there are usbscan, usbprint, usb aapl, usb ehci, usbhub,
usbscan within the
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services key. I have not
ever had a need to disable any of the others, but I would imagine that
something could be done.

I would agree that USB storage devices are unwelcome in the enterprise
workplace, my opinion being based on the damage I have seen caused by
them firsthand whilst performing audits/assessments.

Additionally, there are USB based toolkits in the wild that can pull
nearly every password contained within a Windows system within
seconds, and even leave behind a nice backdoor, admin account, or
keylogger as well.

I have to say that the combination of end-user local administrative
rights combined with USB storage devices can be a very destructive
thing indeed.

One solution I have seen that works well enough is called
USB-Defender™ by a company called TriGeo. This combines what I would
define as an administrative rootkit "Agent" with administrative
monitoring and control software, and a rack mount hardware device
capable of IDS behavior.

> From what I have seen it is an excellent platform to provide
additional end user security/monitoring/control.

Here is a link for clarity:

http://www.trigeo.com/products/usbdefender/



Lucas S. Lyon
Information Security Analyst
(225) 253-1716


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On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 3:15 PM, Adam Pal <pal_adam () gmx net> wrote:
> Hello Steve,
>
> There is also sanctuary device control which provides the same level
> of control as you described bellow.
>
> BUT:
> I disagree that you dont care what happens to them, see, by the
> encryption of the USB, you provide the control on the devices and the
> user but not on the content. If one of the devices can be used to load
> malicious code on the USB, you have an uncontroled "virtual" data flow
> by the USB.
>
>
>
> --
> Best regards,
>  Adam Pal
>
> Wednesday, October 15, 2008, 11:59:45 AM, you wrote:
>
> <==============Original message text===============
> SA> Jon,
>
> SA> But now you have expanded the argument as Users should not be operating
> SA> CIS equipment as administrators.  USB is not at fault here it is the
> SA> risk owners not actually getting a grip and reducing the risks they own.
> SA> I too have seen systems where users are logging on as Admin (and we were
> SA> even asked to undertake penetration testing against the internal LAN!),
> SA> but these are not LANs that can be secured.
>
> SA> However, the software we use (on correctly configured networks) is
> SA> http://www.becrypt.com/uk/solutions/connect_protect.php  which works
> SA> very nicely, and on the Gov systems that we advise on we implement
> SA> encryption on the USB sticks too - that way we don't care what happens
> SA> to them; if they connect they are encrypted and if the user is not
> SA> authorised to use that device or it is not encrypted, then it is not
> SA> accessible.
>
> SA> Steve
>
> SA> -----Original Message-----
> SA> From: listbounce () securityfocus com
> SA> [mailto:listbounce () securityfocus com]
> SA> On Behalf Of Jon Kibler
> SA> Sent: Sunday, October 12, 2008 2:39 PM
> SA> To: Steve Armstrong
> SA> Cc: Steven Bonici; security-basics () securityfocus com
> SA> Subject: Re: Flash Drive Policy
>
> SA> * PGP Signed by an unknown key
>
> SA> Steve Armstrong wrote:
> > > I mus ttake issue with your 2nd point as I believe the 'head in the
> > > sand' approach to USB devices is so 1990's. USB is used in most
> > > businesses and it will continue to increase with the demise of open
> > > network shares on Corp lans (aka the swap share) and the introduction
> SA> of
> > > desktops to the Corp environment without ps/2 interfaces.
> > >
> > > I agree that policy and appropriate software can reduce the risk from
> > > USB devices but that is not our call (security advisors) it's the risk
> > > owners - who in my experieance are some of those asking  for them in
> SA> the
> > > first place.
>
> SA> Steve,
>
> SA> The problem I have is that most risk owners do not understand security
> SA> and the regulatory and business policies that drive them. That is why
> SA> security develops and deploys security policy. So, I would argue that it
> SA> IS the place of security to set policy for USB devices.
>
> SA> Regarding network shares, a lot of organizations are moving to all
> SA> network based storage, and either thin clients or no data stored on
> SA> local desktops. In such an environment, sharing data simply becomes a
> SA> matter of setting the correct access permissions. Collaboration software
> SA> suites (sharepoint, zimbra, etc.) are also being used to accomplish such
> SA> sharing.
>
> SA> Then, at least here in the states, we have regulatory issues that come
> SA> into play when you look at removable media issues. When you have to have
> SA> full audits of "who did what to this data, how, when, and from where",
> SA> the use of USB or other removable media simply makes these types of
> SA> audit trails impossible. So, I stick with my original statement that
> SA> there is no place for USB or other removable media in the workplace.
>
> SA> Finally, you indicated that there is 'appropriate software' that can
> SA> reduce the risks associated with USB drives. Please give some examples!
> SA> I have not seen any type of USB management software that cannot be
> SA> easily defeated by the typical desktop user -- especially if they have
> SA> local admin rights (which I find over 95% of all corporate desktop users
> SA> have!). I have yet to find a USB management package that would prevent
> SA> an attack as simple as plugging in a USB hub and using it to share your
> SA> rodent and a USB drive.
>
> SA> So, bottom line... I have to disagree. I stick by my argument that you
> SA> should not allow any USB or other removable media in the workplace.
>
> SA> Jon
> SA> --
> SA> Jon R. Kibler
> SA> Chief Technical Officer
> SA> Advanced Systems Engineering Technology, Inc.
> SA> Charleston, SC  USA
> SA> o: 843-849-8214
> SA> c: 843-224-2494
> SA> s: 843-564-4224
> SA> http://www.linkedin.com/in/jonrkibler
>
> SA> My PGP Fingerprint is:
> SA> BAA2 1F2C 5543 5D25 4636 A392 515C 5045 CF39 4253
>
>
> SA> * Unknown Key
> SA> * 0xCF394253(L)
>
>
>
>
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