Security Basics mailing list archives

Re: Ecryption Cracking Tools


From: Austin Murkland <amurkland () merydion com>
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2005 11:54:11 -0700

I had a thought. With all the talk of honeypot systems, and services. Wouldn't it make more sense to have a Crypto cipher that took into account the possibility of being brute forced and provided one or more sets of logical pseudo-information when cracked, but only the real information when actually cracked/authenticated?

at it's simplest level, have one set of data that is the actual message, and another set of data that is something that could be the actual message. Security would increase given the number of sets of pseudo-data included in the encrypted message...so if it were cracked using brute force, how would they know it was actually what they were looking for. My understanding is that brute force relies on there being only one possible true answer for it to work. While this is still true with this idea, there also exists multiple pseudo-answers that provide information that may or may not look like the actual answer. This could be combined with further honeypot systems and ids to both make it difficult to get to the correct system, and to immediately be notified that someone is actively trying to brute force your encryption and it's time to change keys. E.g. a password is encrypted using this method, and 30 sets of pseudo-data is included in the encrypted password. lets say when properly brute forced it provides 20 deadend passwords that just don't work, 10 passwords that lead to honeypots systems, and 1 real password that gets them, or the authenticated user in. if they try any of the 30, before the 1, an IDS could be easily configured to ban their IP, alert the admin, or even run a script that does all this and then changes the key.

i don't know if this is a new idea or not.. i guess it would be HoneyPot Encryption... ?

Austin Murkland

john () gmail com wrote:
Use a Vernam cipher. If you do it right it will be fun to watch them try to crack it.





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