Security Basics mailing list archives

RE: UNIX password auditing tool and the search for dictionaries too


From: "Tim Heagarty" <tim () heagarty com>
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2003 09:27:41 -0700

Please pardon me if this has already been covered in this thread, I didn't
see the earlier posts on the subject.

First the PIN algorithm is widely known and there really is no need for much
of a PIN cracker program. Like DES the algorithm is published but the keys
are kept secret. If an institution uses a simplistic key, which some do,
then it is trivial to derive the natural PIN. However most systems don't use
the natural PIN but create an offset that is mod 10 added to the natural PIN
to create the number that you remember and don't write down anywhere.

Bruteforce is handled in one of two ways on almost all ATM systems. On a
"track 3 write" system the PIN retry count is decremented and written onto
the card so it counts down and when it hits 0 the bank has the option to
perform a card retain or just give it back to you with instructions to go
into the bank and take care of the problem.

The second method simply records the retry count at the host and the same
retain/return decision is made when the retry count is exceeded. Either way
there is no bruteforce available beyond three tries. Now if you have a card
writer and can keep resetting the retry count or bump it up to 99 to start
with you have a slightly greater advantage. You have to properly calculate
the LRC on the card too without fudging up the data and having the modified
card retained on the first insertion.

Thank you,

Tim Heagarty CISSP, MCSE
Tim at TheaSecure dot com
http://www.TheaSecure.com/
"There are only 10 kinds of people in the world, those that understand
binary, and those that don't."

-----Original Message-----
From: Tomas Wolf [mailto:tomas () skip cz] 
Sent: Saturday, August 09, 2003 4:04 AM
To: Michael Martinez
Cc: security-basics () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: UNIX password auditing tool and the search for 
dictionaries too


I would like to note a little about the security of 4 digit 
pin... I believe that author wanted to point out that thanks 
to the fact, that you can't try the 4 digit number more than 
three times at a time - which makes it a pretty strong 
system, not that 4 digit is a strong password. 
Of course who has the time, can go from ATM to ATM and try 
two passwords at the time to bruteforce it, but that is 
almost impossible to achieve (since anybody responsible who 
looses any type of financial card usualy reports it the same 
day). We have four digits with possible ten variants = 10 on 
the fourth power = 10.000 possibilities that is (divided by 
two tries per card insertion) 5.000 maximum tries, which 
gives us 2.500 average tries to get the right pin (approx. 
1.250 card insertion of two tries)... And let's get the 
theory little further, let say that each insertion takes 15 
seconds, that is 1.250x15 =  18.750 second = 312.5 minutes = 
5.208~ hrs. of actuall interaction with ATM... Well maybe for 
a student :-) I believe that security is always a trade off. 
To have top noch security one has to count with a lot of 
expenses with training people to understand and use the craft 
of security. Not many end users a willing to authenticate 
more than one time, they need to work and not to worry about 
IT stuff, that is why we are here, or am I wrong? But there 
is always more, isn't there? :-)

Good luck to you all...
Tomas


Before you go too far with strong passwords, remember, they do more
harm
than good in most cases. You trust your money to a four 
digit pin so 
think about strong authentication, not strong passwords. 
Two factor 
can be done with a variety of inexpensive technologies.

Are you kidding me, you are under the impression that a 4 
digit pin is 
secure?  I for one have no illusions about how insecure a 4 
digit pin 
actually is!  Whatever security is provided by said 4 digit pin is 
more related to that fact that there are not freely available pin 
cracking tools for ATM machines...as there are password cracking 
tools.

Strong passwords are the number one source of denial of service in 
most environments due to the frequent false reject problem that 
occurs when users can't keep up with frequent changes and strong 
password. They're also one of the highest costs for security since 
it's the number one task for help desks and sys admins to support.

As a help desk supervisor, I assure you that the related 
cost of time 
and money supporting the reset of passwords is minimal and 
therefore a 
small price to pay for increased security.

...

In terms of dictionaries, I think the aggressive approach would 
include concatenations and number and special character injections 
into the words. In more secure environments, were users 
are battered 
with
monthly
password changes they usually inject the numeric value for 
the month 
somewhere in a common word. But the point is, it's not too 
difficult 
to build a really big database of words with special character and 
numeric injections, run them through the hash algorithm and have a 
table to check for matches.

If someone were in an environment where they must change their 
password monthly...they are probably using the wrong technology.  
Perhaps a combination of different layers would be a better 
solution 
to monthly changes.

...

-----Original Message-----
From: Shane Lahey [mailto:s.lahey () roadrunner nf net]
Sent: Monday, August 04, 2003 7:38 PM
To: james.easterling () ed gov; security-basics () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: UNIX password auditing tool

Alec Muffett Crack :: http://www.crypticide.org/users/alecm/

-----Original Message-----
From: james.easterling () ed gov [mailto:james.easterling () ed gov]
Sent: Monday, August 04, 2003 4:39 PM
To: security-basics () securityfocus com
Subject: UNIX password auditing tool



I have tried searches for UNIX password cracking tools and I have 
come
up
with little value.  Can someone direct me to passwd 
auditing tools 
besides "John The Ripper" that are free or cost?

Regards,
James



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